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Stanley Cavell, Film Studies, and Vertigo 
Andrew Paul Djaballah 
American philosopher Hillary Putnam has said that Stanley Cavell is the only 
philosopher to have made writing about movies a part of his philosophical project. Since 
1971, with the publication of The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film, 
Cavell has actively pursued questions concerning the physical medium of the movies - as 
well as its aesthetics, its history, and its criticism - as part of his reflections on our human 
experience of the world. This essay attempts to unearth some of th e earliest of Cavell's 
insights into the movies through a study of certain short passages on Vertigo by framing 
Cavell's study with the examination of one of the most popular texts in Academic Film 
Studies, feminist film theorist Laura Mulvey's "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema." 
The conclusions of this analysis are offset by a survey of the recent psychoanalytic 
studies of Vertigo by Lacanian cultural critic Slajov Zizek. The conjunction of these two 
excursions away from Cavell sets the stage for a discussion of his interpretation of the 
film, pieced together from sections of The World Viewed and Pursuits of Happiness. 
Themes of the screen creation of women, of the transformative powers of the camera, and 
of the role of the movie director, together forecast the most admired contribution this 
American philosopher has offered to Academic Film Studies: the definition of the related 
genres of the Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage and the Hollywood Melodrama of the 
Unknown Woman. 
IV 
Film is a moving image of skepticism: not only is there a reasonable 
possibility, it is a fact that here our normal senses are satisfied of reality 
while reality does not exist - even, alarmingly, because it does not exist, 
because viewing it is all it takes. 
Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the 
Ontology of Film (Enlarged Edition) 188-9 
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1 
Introduction 
James Conant, now at the University of Chicago and widely considered an 
authority on Wittgenstein, was a student of Stanley Cavell at Harvard in the 1980s. The 
first collection of essays gathered around the work of Stanley Cavell was a special 
dedicated edition of the Bucknell Review, published in 1989, entitled The Senses of 
Stanley Cavell} In Conant's offering to the collection, he sets up a distinction of voices 
in his text by killing one of them and having another other speak its obituary. The 
primary setup his essay poses is of a young James Conant, still under candidature at 
Harvard, under pressure to contribute to this particular collection of essays. Now, 
whatever was at stake for him, then, found its way into his essay as a way of contributing 
this form of writing as a perspicuous way of reading Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. The 
obituary mode offers the voice of the original, well-intentioned, reproachable, and hence 
unwritten essay, resurrected as an afterthought. The obituary reader, the narrator of his 
(written) essay, follows the thrust of the early essay, section by section, describing its 
arguments, where it comes in as valuable, as well as where it falls short or meets a dead-
end. The position this reader takes is above the absent voice, able to gauge where things 
worked and where things did not. Conant's performance of this positioning is unique in 
its genre: taking his own efforts as fodder for philosophical afterthought, he postures with 
these as the performance of problems found in Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. 
1
 Richard Fleming and Michael Payne, eds. The Senses of Stanley Cavell [Fairfield, NJ: Associated 
University Presses, 1989]. This title is an adaptation of the title of CavelPs book on Thoreau's Walden, The 
Senses of Walden, and though the word "senses" does not immediately suggest the paradox of its dual use. 
The common use of the term is in its denotation of human capacities to be impressed by the external world, 
e.g. the capacity of sight, or touch; another common use is in its indicating a capacity for thought, e.g. 
you've lost your senses. The contradiction in these uses, mixing the sensorial dimension of the limits of 
knowledge with what comes up against these limits, can only be absorbed on review of such limits. Call 
this mode afterthought. 
2 
Overwhelmed and seized with dissatisfaction with the words he can gather, the first 
writing baulks and withholds its writing, and the obituary reader comes in to show what 
the first cannot say. This amounts, as well, to the performance of such an obituary as a 
form of showing what could not, or cannot, be said; hence the title of the essay, "Must we 
show what we cannot say?" 
Cavell's first book on film was an exercise of a similar stripe - the animus of The 
World Viewed was to resist the voices of his interlocutors, who offer the easy words for 
understanding film that children grow up with, and to push himself, the narrator, to find 
more suitable, more appropriate, more accurate words which he could stand by. Conant's 
text makes plain the other side of this early project in film studies: while resisting the 
common expressions, he would find himself struggling to show how his words did fit, 
despite the often awkward wordplays, despite the requirement for him to explain at length 
his correctives. Through this struggle to articulate concepts relating to our experience of 
movies, rather than through a dogmatic declaration of film's ontology, we are invited to 
identify with the absent voice he is resisting, and then to follow his ways out of this 
voice, out of these words. 
There is a shift in this work on film from Cavell's first book: Must We Mean What 
We Say? is a collection of essays which can be taken, loosely, as asking (or showing) 
what counts as institutional Philosophy through essays on what will become recognized 
as his areas of expertise, on Wittgenstein, on skepticism , on literature as philosophy, and 
on aesthetics. He speaks of avoiding or repressing thoughts on film during the writing of 
some of the essays, namely "The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear" to which 
we also may want intuitively to include "Music Discomposed" and "A Matter of 
3 
Meaning It." In his second book, Cavell is no longer openly discussing what counts as 
philosophy - though it is clear that this project fits under what the previous book 
advances as philosophy. The question driving this book, coming from the philosophical 
position demanding the investigation of our experience, is about our experience of the 
movies, of conversations about movies, and about the memory of both of these - "What 
is film?"2 
The performance of both voices, of both sides of a dialogue, is as old as 
philosophy itself. It typically functions with one figure standing in for the author, and the 
other standing in for the reader, where latter begins with a position from which he will be 
led, through steps of arguments, to the position of the former. But the twist of resisting 
the identification of the author with one of these voices, as well as the identification (as a 
reader) with one of these voices, creates another plane on which these writers and readers 
in the text can be gauged from without. It becomes a mode of philosophical 
improvisation, provisionally staging a dialogue of points and counter-points, only to 
emerge in the end, perfectly willing to "do away with the ladder" as Wittgenstein 
famously ends his Tractatus. So it is not a teacher leading a pupil from A to B, but an 
author showing the teacher lead the pupil, or the author playing out voices that shape to a 
whole. 
In Conant's description of Wittgenstein's "specific contribution" to Cavell's 
writing on skepticism, he uses the same posturing as the one mentioned above with the 
voices. Conant poses the struggle between the skeptic and the antiskeptic as "stamped by 
a shared set of preoccupations, each bearing the mark of the other, locked together in a 
2
 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film [Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1979], 15. 
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dialectic of insistence and counterinsistence." The position taken by Cavell is at a remove 
from this, not "taking sides in the struggle" but seeking out its conditions, what "sets it 
off." Cavell's early work on film, digested through the project on skepticism together 
with his preoccupation with the form of philosophical writing and its relation to what 
motivates philosophy, takes the form of seeking out and probing the conditions of his 
interest in his experience of cinema. 
* 
This study is an exploration of Cavell's early writing on film. The first chapter 
examines his study of the medium of film from the early chapters of The World Viewed, 
taking cues from key passages from Must We Mean What we Say? that couch the text in a 
more explicit philosophical context. Cavell's insistence on the fact of what he calls film's 
"projection of reality," as compared with and opposed to modes of representation of other 
media, is brought out against his particular reflections on the origins of film, both 
ontological and metaphysical. His unique undertaking of relying on his own experience 
of movie-going to draw general claims about cinema are sketched briefly as a conclusion 
to chapter one. 
Chapter two is meant to function as a bridge between theoretical questions of film 
and the interpretive practices associated with such theories. The focus of this chapter 
moves away from Cavell and falls on two studies of Hitchcock's celebrated masterpiece 
Vertigo: first by feminist film scholar Laura Mulvey, then by Lacanian cultural critic 
Slajov Zizek. Mulvey's interpretation of the Hitchcock film is found in her very short 
paper entitled "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema." Our text largely follows film 
scholar Marian Keane, a once student of Stanley Cavell's, and her criticism of Mulvey's 
5 
text in "A Closer Look at Scopophilia: Mulvey, Hitchcock, and Vertigo." To balance 
Mulvey's extreme mode of interpretation, our study shifts to Zizek's various remarks on 
Hitchcock and Vertigo from his studies of Lacan and of Deleuze through popular culture. 
Far closer in many respects to Cavell than Mulvey, Zizek's methods and analysis of 
Vertigo nonetheless contrasts strongly to Cavell's genre of film study. 
The third chapter returns to Cavell and to The World Viewed to examine his 
reading of Vertigo in light of his onto logical remarks about the camera laid out in the first 
chapter. Our examination begins however with a passage from his 1981 Pursuits of 
Happiness to ease through what his earlier text only hints at concerning the theme of the 
cinematic creation of woman: a theme at the heart of his famous definitions of the 
remarriage comedy and melodrama of the unknown woman genres. There seemed no 
other choice than Vertigo to best situate Cavell's early work on film in relation to both his 
own later work and the larger field of film study. 
6 
Chapter 1 
The method that Cavell appropriates from Wittgenstein is not something that he 
has learned from him but that he has found him to model most clearly - the concept of 
moral Perfectionism that Cavell locates in Emerson years later models the same 
procedures. A quick sketch of the procedures governing one's appeals to ordinary 
language involves two movements. The first movement happens, if and when one lets it 
happen, when one finds oneself lost (like Dante's traveler), or jailed (in the woods like 
the author of Walden), or chained and in a dark cave (like the prisoners of Plato's 
allegory are compelled to realize). Wittgenstein will say that a "philosophical problem 
has the form: "I don't know my way about."3 Finding oneself in this situation is the first 
step, is the taking upon oneself, of a philosophical problem. The Oracle said that Socrates 
was wise because he knew he did not know - Cavell takes this to mean that "about the 
questions which were causing him wonder and hope and confusion and pain, he knew 
that he did not know what no man can know" and hence, found himself in the position of 
taking on philosophy. Yet he was found wise because he also knew that "any man could 
learn what he wanted to learn. No man is in any better position for knowing it than any 
other man - unless wanting to know is a special position."4 Thus, Socrates embodies the 
posture of philosophy at its origin, hence Wittgenstein's describing a late stage of 
philosophy as bringing "words back from their metaphysical use to their everyday use."5 
This return to the ordinary implies that the first movement has brought us off somewhere 
3
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe trans., [New York: The 
MacMillan Company, 1953] §123,49. 
4
 Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?: A Collection of Essays, [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976] xxviii. 
5
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §116,48. 
7 
away from the ordinary, that we have sought authority in some alterity - he says that "the 
confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling"6; or that "a 
philosophical problem arises when language goes on a holiday." Therefore, when the 
engine is revved, when the holiday is over, and the ordinary routine and language-game 
are returned to, then philosophical problems should end; one should have found their way 
home again. Wittgenstein says that "the clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete 
clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely 
o 
disappear." Philosophy this way seems far less like a tradition of formal arguments and 
bitter rancorous retorts than an open-ended way of problem solving. 
In the same passage where he asks if this amounts to a world-view, Wittgenstein 
explicitly likens his methods to therapies. Cavell pursues this connection and suggests 
psychoanalytic therapies as modeling the way solutions are to be arrived at with problems 
of aesthetics: 
.. .the more one learns, so to speak, the hang of oneself, and mounts one's 
problems, the less one is able to say what one has learned; not because you 
have forgotten what it was, but because nothing you said would seem like 
an answer or a solution: there is no longer any question or problem which 
your words would match.9 
He calls this a process of "naturalizing ourselves to a new form of life, to a new world."10 
Reading Cavell's application of these methods to problems of aesthetics into the very title 
6
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations i § 132, 51. 
7
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §38, 19. 
8
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §133, 51. 
9
 Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, 85-6. 
10
 Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, 84. 
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of the book on film is simply tracking the progression of his thoughts in this period. What 
it opens up is a way of reading Cavell's film project as an attempt to use film as a means 
of prying into our shared consciousness, so to speak, our shared fears, joys, pains and 
prospects. 
To begin with, the point Cavell's title makes in drawing near to the senses of a 
Weltanschauung and to Heidegger's thought is first that this is itself a practice that is part 
of a particular form of life, of a particular context of conventions with rules and 
precedents and ways to go about performing these and of avoiding them. The title is not 
meant to wear anything on its sleeve, that is, it is not meant not to be obscure - one must 
track down the original language-games, so to speak, where these terms and concepts are 
at home. That the names of Heidegger and Wittgenstein come to the fore, suggests a 
certain context of philosophical games. However, from the very first words of the 
preface, when he is invoking the memories of movies of a period of his lifetime that 
began in childhood, he describes the effort to account for these condition as "the 
philosophical motivation" of his book. The autobiographical element of his writing, 
which has dominated his latest efforts at writing, is present here in a raw form: the 
experiences of films are emblematic of shared human experiences and hence provide the 
grounds and the authority to speak on such things. 
On its face, the title plays with what modern philosophy has considered the 
problem of the external world. Descartes famously rehearses the proof of his own 
existence, and hence his assurance under a benevolent God of the existence of the world 
and of others, by saying to himself, in his mind, "I am." This first and fatal step is of 
course prepared for by the inward turns of the Reformation, whose assurance of the world 
9 
(and of heaven) is governed by a horizon of understanding where the existence of God is 
unquestioned. The gap that inserts itself here between what one says in one's mind and 
what occurs out there in the world has grown, since no longer assured by God. Kant 
proposes that the human categories of understanding necessarily reveal what can be 
known of the world. For Kant this was once and for all, and yet the gap still grows, and 
subjectivity still harbors the threat of metaphysical isolation. The world viewed, Cavell 
says, is one where views are taken from or of it. Heidegger says that this is an age where 
our understanding of the world is as view. In our familiar practice of going to the movies 
and in our saucy and careless attendance to them (not o/them), our distance from the 
world could not more aptly be epitomized. 
Cavell asks, relating to the passage quoted earlier, whether "solving" 
philosophical problems count as a change in world-view, and in the extension of the title, 
implies the question of the emergence of film together with a cultural shift, as part of a 
Weltanschauung. I would now add, with a slight inflection - is it metaphysics, or does it 
share the conditions of metaphysics? If one would claim that one's views in the cinema 
are like the "views" of the metaphysical world, then they are insisting on a literal sense of 
viewing as perceiving that is opposed to (and connected with) one of viewing as 
conceiving; because in action and in thought, a film audience is taking in views of the 
world. But are these merely sights of the world? A preliminary question to this is asked in 
a related passage from chapter 2 of The World Viewed: Cavell provocatively proposes 
that "a photograph does not present us with "likenesses" of things; it presents us, we want 
to say, with the things themselves."11 While on the surface, he seems to be undertaking a 
11
 Cavell, The World Viewed, 17. 
10 
discussion around Panofsky and Bazin's use of terminology - Bazin offers that cinema 
"is in its essence a dramaturgy of Nature", Panofsky "reality as such". But the allusion to 
Kant is unmissable, (and no less clearly in Panofsky). The discussion revolves rather 
around the distinction between "things themselves" and things-in-themselves. In Kant's 
Inaugural Dissertation, for instance, he says that sensible thoughts are representations of 
things as they appear, while intellectual thoughts are representations of things as they are. 
In the first Critique, he will contrast phenomena of the sensible world with noumena of 
the intelligible world. Of course, Cavell is not postulating that the images of film 
compose some type of tangible shape of the intelligible world, a world of forms or ideas 
from which possibilities of the sensible world can thus be derived. The world of film is 
the world of phenomena, of appearances. Yet he views we take of this world offered by 
the camera are from a world that "is holding the rest of the world away."12 Very like 
Heidegger's sense of the world as view, as limited to what is "held at bay". 
The title's question, taken in its many forms, opens an investigation into the 
practice of movie going and into the art of the movies that begins with Cavell's book on 
film and continues throughout his celebrated career. Before continuing with the joint idea 
of things themselves and appearances in the section to follow, permit a line from a recent 
lecture delivered at Mt.Holyoke late last century to capture in its way what only maturity 
can see retrospectively: 
In Classical philosophy, impressions are understood as predictable effects 
of objects upon my senses. I am interested in the concept of an impression 
as an experience that a portion of the world unpredictably makes upon me, 
12
 Cavell, The World Viewed, 24. 
11 
gives me, in which it captures my interest, matters to me, or fails to; a 
product of significance, not of causation. 
Alas, the world viewed as impressions made upon me capitulates his earlier allusion to 
Kant as his shift from epistemology to aesthetics and moral philosophy. 
The idea of the world of film as one of appearances may at first seem obvious or 
trivial. For even without acknowledging that the world on screen is our world on screen, 
one must accept that there is an appearance of something - even if it is only light. In his 
1935 lecture course, Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger devotes a section to the 
distinction between "Being and Appearance" - he draws here three modes to which the 
term "appearance" fits: 1) as glow and luster; 2) as the manifestation of something; 3) as 
mere seeming. He then remarks that second mode suits the first and the third as the basis 
of the possibility of this appearance - that the essence of appearance lies in this mode of 
manifestation of something: Cavell insists on this very point about what is on screen - "It 
is an incontestable fact that in a motion picture no live human being is up there. But a 
human something is."13 Both Heidegger and Cavell follow with the concept and term of 
presentness as a key to this idea of appearance. 
When Cavell says that thoughts of movies had been repressed during the last 
stages ofMWM, he was referring to his essay on Lear entitled "The Avoidance of Love: 
A Reading of King Lear". In his essay on Beckett, the reading of "Endgame", he makes 
analogies with movies in a casual way. In his essay "A Matter of Meaning It", an essay 
discussing issues of intention and meaning in art and assumptions about their relation to 
each other, he closes with an extended illustration of his point with an example from 
13
 Cavell, The World Viewed, 26. 
12 
Fellini and his film La Strada (1954). These essays do not pick up the films as having 
something themselves to say about the issues at hand but only offer illustrations to points 
that could well have been illustrated otherwise. Cavell's claim of repressing thoughts 
about movies in the writing of "The Avoidance of Love" is precisely the repression of 
what movies would have to say about such concepts as audience and performance, world 
and reality, as differently and uniquely as only film could. His book on film comes out of 
MWM like a flood of water from an opened dam. 
The first discussion of the concept of presentness at any length comes about 
around the way we treat the existence of characters in the play. To this end, he states that 
characters in a play are not nor can they become aware of their audience - the obvious 
implication follows that characters and actors have different existences, since the actors 
cannot not at any time be aware of their audience. He will say about this that we, the 
audience, "are not in their presence."14 Hence the turnaround - they - the characters, are 
in our presence. This turnaround carries with it not simply that we see them before us, 
"but that we are acknowledging them (or specifically failing to)." The question of how to 
make oneself present to the character, of acknowledgment as a reversal of Heidegger's 
second mode of appearance, takes up the remaining twenty or so pages of Must We Mean 
What we Say?. In the line immediately following the phrase about characters, he 
mentions that this is like acknowledging or failing to acknowledge "the presence of the 
world." This mode of acknowledgment has to do with placing ourselves in the presence 
of the world, hence, or revealing ourselves to the world. Cavell's idea of presentness 
captures precisely the second mode of Heidegger's triptych modes of appearance, as well 
14
 Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, 332. 
13 
as a response in the form of a reversal, in the very terms in which he will return in TWV. 
The task or charge of making oneself present to the world of film, to its mythological 
existence, is at work throughout TWV. The discussion around presentness mentioned 
above is teased out in the following section with respect to the conditions of the theater to 
prepare for a fuller staging of Cavell's examination of film. 
1.2 
In a way, Cavell suggests, the so-called mirror-held-up-to-nature in the theater 
more fully satisfies our "wish for the world" than the camera does. Here, the people and 
things that the audience sees are present. Both sides of the camera are here in one shared 
space. Nonetheless, there is a divide between the audience and the characters. Here, there 
are no mechanisms that separate them; it is all up to conventions. Cavell speaks of the 
characters as unaware of their audience and expresses this by saying "We are not in their 
presence." Using the same terminology, he follows this by stating that the characters are 
in the presence of the audience. What is the stage that it can contain such conventions of 
presence and absence?1 
In the second part of his reading of King Lear, written immediately before his 
book on film, Cavell reflects on the phenomenology of theater. The focus is on the 
experience of the audience: "the first task of the dramatist is to gather us and then to 
silence us and immobilize us." He quickly defers the gathering to the advertizing poster, 
15
 In speaking of the presence and absence of characters rather than of actors, the authenticity of the mirror 
held to nature may seem duplicitous. This might lead one to suggest that it is the actors who are present to 
the audience, and the actors who resist reacting to the presence of the audience. The presence of the actors 
on the stage however is not what typically draws the audience, and is certainly not what immobilize and 
silence them. The theater is about the play, and the play is about the character and his words. 
14 
and the silencing to the dimming house-lights, leaving the job of immobilization, of 
"rewarding this disruption", to the dramatist. So what does an audience expect in going to 
a theater show? Why gather and sit quietly in the dark before a stage of sets and 
performers?16 
Cavell recounts a joke about a Southern yokel in attendance at a performance of 
Othello. The joke has the yokel spring onto the stage during Desdemona's strangulation 
to save her from the dark brute. What is so funny? That southern chivalry at times is too 
strong for some to keep in check? The yokel's ignorance of proper behavior in a theater 
offers us a little chuckle, but what type of ignorance is this? Cavell asks what mistake the 
yokel has made, and makes the analogy with "drinking from the finger bowl." It is the 
mistake of the outsider fumbling with customs that are not his. 
Cavell's tactic in appealing to the yokel joke is to first show that the observance 
of theater customs are givens; then, when we are smirking at the backwardness of the 
outsider, he asks how we would correct his mistake. The stick in insisting on how he is to 
be corrected is that the answers that come readily to mind are simply unsatisfactory and 
ineffectual. For instance, it is different than correcting a child who makes the same 
mistake. Following Cavell's example, to tell the child screaming at Red Riding Hood to 
calm down and sit quietly amounts to teaching the child how to control his outbursts; he 
needs to learn to behave. It is also different than scolding a man for smoking in church: 
he needs to be reminded that this type of behavior is inappropriate, that he is behaving 
badly. To correct the yokel, one would need to teach him how to behave - not just how to 
sit calmly and quietly, but why and how this particular behavior can be rewarding. 
16
 Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, 326-7. 
15 
The yokel thinks there is someone on stage strangling a woman, so he bursts onto 
the scene. What then? We tell him this is inappropriate. But it is more than this: the play 
would stop, at least until the yokel could be dragged off the stage. His behavior with 
respect to the play is not merely inappropriate, it is incoherent. The customs he ignores 
are the very ones that hold the people gathered there together. The dramatist can hardly 
be held responsible for his education. The inverse is closer to the truth - like the child 
who is carried away, the yokel is so caught up that he needs to be told that it's a play, 
only a play. But telling him that it's not real is what one would say to a child. It is not "an 
instructive remark, but an emergency measure." Then what would count as instructing the 
yokel?17 
The explanation that the man strangling the woman is pretending falls into the 
same emergency register. What is it from behind the convention (that absorbs the fact 
that they are play-acting) that stops any of the members of the audience from going up 
there? Part of the structure of the theater that makes room for our immobilization is the 
requirement of our acceptance of the stage as a world. It is only upon this acceptance that 
Othello and Desdemona can be present at all. The trouble the yokel has with accepting 
this world is that it implies accepting his absence from it. His efforts to make himself 
present to that world are precisely what cause it to vanish. As soon as he sets foot on 
stage, the world evaporates. 
How is the particular mirror of the theater more satisfying that the camera's? The 
plain fact that there are people up there, in flesh and in blood, makes it so. But it also 
complicates things. Cavell's words about the characters of that world, since after all, the 
17
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theater is all about characters and their words, lead towards his answer for the yokel. We 
accept the world and we acknowledge its characters. He begins with the analogue of our 
absence from their world by saying that a "character is not, and cannot become, aware of 
us", hence, "We are not in their presence." This of course stands to reason, as does the 
flip side: "They are in our presence." What this pair of relations conceals is that we are in 
fact in the presence of the actors on stage. Their task is to ingest this presence while they 
perform and become the character, don not merely its clothes but its very soul as well. 
What then is up to us, sitting there unseen, immobile? 
The philosophical problem of other minds has been put in various ways in recent 
centuries but always with the same sense that human beings are alone in the experience 
of their subjectivity and cannot break past this subjectivity and reach into another. Cavell 
studies King Lear in the first part of this essay as an examination of this very problem 
through Lear's affliction of blindness to his daughters (framed by the previous essay 
"Knowing and Acknowledging," that sketches a move from skepticism to recognition and 
back again to a now truncated-skepticism). The acknowledgement of the stage's 
characters is a form of owning the knowledge of them, something one has to bring 
oneself to. Cavell proposes that this is a form of confrontation. This seems paradoxical, 
for we just saw that we cannot interact with the characters and any effort to do so would 
kill the performance. We could also say that the characters are confronting us, and we can 
either rise to the occasion or fail to. His term for this is the acknowledgement of the 
characters. But in what way do the characters, who cannot acknowledge us, confront us? 
The idea of acknowledgment is brought into play in an earlier essay from Must 
We Mean what We Say?, "Knowing and Acknowledging", where Cavell reads and walks 
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through a key step in Wittgenstein's infamous private language argument: whether it is 
proper to say that one's pain is the same as another's or that there are two pains. The idea 
is that what is referred to in certain circles as "the problem of other minds," whether we 
can know, can be certain of, the existence of others, is not a matter of certainty. In other 
words, certainty does not provide the grounds on which to recognize the other - this type 
of recognition requires an openness, an acceptance, a leap. It needs to be acknowledged. 
That person, his or her pain, only exists when the confrontation is met. Cavell puts this as 
the "claim" your suffering makes on me, assuming the recognition that he or she (his or 
her pain) exists. What's more of this recognition is that it comes from our understanding 
of human expression as expressive of human beings. The acknowledgment of the 
existence of other minds takes the form of a response to the claims the mind's body 
18 
expresses. 
The notion of acknowledgment in the theater then becomes problematic, or rather 
more complex. Within the span of a few dozen pages, Cavell has used the same term for 
both cases in a more or less technical way to describe two seemingly contradictory 
positions. In life, the acknowledgment of another human means recognizing the humanity 
in the expression of a human body, and acting upon this recognition. In the theater, we 
are not present to the characters; hence our confrontation cannot take the form of 
expressing our recognition. 
Acknowledgment in the theater is the acknowledgment of its characters. The 
impossibility of confronting them, say of meeting them in confrontation, says something 
about the kind of confrontation Cavell is talking about. His description of the conditions 
18Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, 256-66. 
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of theater as a certain presence and absence, his insistence on the importance of the 
physical presence of the actors, and his specific location of the abyss between audience 
and character, all set up his question about the existence of characters on stage. The 
acknowledgment of the existence of the minds of characters does not need to account for 
our passiveness; that is just what the theater is. The point where it begins to feel as if 
something is missing, that something is falling short with this type of knowledge, is 
where Cavell reverses the problem. We feel this type of knowledge is incomplete against 
an understanding of how it works in actuality: 
When we do not [reveal ourselves], when we keep ourselves in the dark, 
the consequence is that we convert the other into a character and make the 
world a stage for him. There is fictional existence with a vengeance... The 
conditions of theater literalize the conditions we exact from outside -
hiddenness, silence, isolation - hence make that existence plain.19 
In comparing tragedy in the theater and tragedy in actuality, he says that in both cases 
"people in pain are in my presence." If acknowledgment amounts to "revealing ourselves, 
allowing ourselves to be seen," such that we may be confronted, then the failure to do so 
makes of the actual world a theater. 
What then is the acknowledgement of characters in a theater? The yokel learns 
that it is incoherent to go up to the actors to confront the characters - another way Cavell 
puts this is that the characters and audience "do not occupy the same space." This much 
is clear. In a turnaround moment, he opens a new direction for his reflection that provides 
a setting for an answer to initial question of acknowledgment: "We do, however, occupy 
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the same time. And the time is always now... measured solely by what is now happening 
to [the characters], for what they are doing now is all that is happening." While the 
audience is not in the presence of the characters (who are in the presence of the 
audience), Cavell says that the audience is, or can be, "in their present." In other words, 
recognizing that what is happening to the characters is in fact happening to these 
characters now, and that I am sitting, facing them, doing nothing.21 
In the first section of his reading of Lear, the idea of self-recognition is pulled out 
as a central theme of the play. Cavell examines how the imagery of sight, including eyes 
and seeing and glances and avoided glances and of blinding, etc., suggests the necessity 
of self-recognition as a condition of recognition. In each case where a character 
recognizes another, there is a moment of self-awareness, self-possession, or self-
consciousness that precedes it. Lear's climactic recognition of Cordelia comes at the 
same time as his recognition of himself as her father. Cavell points out that, 
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phenomenologically, self-recognition is a form of insight. 
Accepting the world of theater as something presently happening, which involves 
making ourselves present to the characters, requires such self-recognition. It is not 
enough though to simply recognize our part in the character, "identifying with him" so to 
speak. Cavell sets our identification with the characters against a backdrop of immediacy: 
they are up there now, and "that I am I, and here." Recognizing our separateness from 
them, our identification with them becomes an acknowledgement of their separateness 
from us. "I make them other, and face them."23 
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The respite from action that we enjoy in the theater during the performance ends 
when the house lights turn on. We are however no less in a present than during the show. 
"Because the actors have stopped, we are freed to act again; but also compelled to. Our 
hiddenness, our silence, and our placement are now our choices." Carrying through our 
acknowledgement of characters means the inverse of identifying with them (if that means 
putting oneself in their shoes): it means recognizing that they are different from us, that 
their cares, their capacities, their knowledge and thoughts are not ours. The difficulty and 
sometimes pain of acknowledgement are in discovering what these are.24 
The awe inspiring nature of theater is what makes it a world. Unlike the novel, 
there can be no omniscient narrator that recounts what is happening to the audience. A 
character can describe events, can lay a setting, can even speak on the inner feelings and 
thoughts of other characters; but they are in no better a position to do this than someone 
in the actual world is. The acceptance of the theater as a world and the acknowledgement 
of its characters as other are responses of awe to this mirror put up to nature. In the face 
of this mirror, we are shown ourselves by making ourselves present at what is happening. 
1.3 
The World Viewed project came from this same connectedness of thought, so why 
did Cavell need a separate book and a separate method to tackle the subject of film? The 
method at work in much of Must We Mean What we Say? simulates the sense of 
anticipating the reader's words, and does in fact anticipate the currents of reading that 
leaves the reader imagining to have wanted to say them first. Different than Conant's 
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method of dialoguing with a lost voice, the capacity to anticipate the reader's words is a 
matter of its engaging in a voice that already exists in the text, of luring the reader into 
identifying with a voice of the text. When a reader is caught, it feels as if the text were 
stealing their words. Reminders about the impersonality of our words, or of our soul, 
often come as a shock. 
When Cavell reflects on his methodology in the addendum "More of The World 
Viewetf he states that this method, used in his previous philosophical writing, was 
reversed when he set to writing about film: "... I felt called upon to voice my responses 
with their privacy, their argumentativeness, even their intellectual perverseness, on their 
face;" as opposed to attempting to find the voice of the reader. In fact, resisting this 
voice, avoiding the thoughts and words that have easy formulas that are "ready to take 
over thinking for us" - he takes as a starting point an effort to purify the concept, pressing 
himself for words about the conditions of film, of its historical manifestation as well as its 
artistic discoveries. 
The first chapter of The World Viewed brings the question "What is film?" to a 
head, in both an autobiographical sense, Cavell being brought up as a boy on the movies, 
and in a historical sense as having lived through an American phenomena. His thinking 
about the medium of film, his inquiries into the essential conditions of what film is, are 
not enumerations of the properties of film but a general investigation of its origins 
through our shared language (forced to adapt to the newness of movies and slow about 
it), through our shared movies, and through our shared existence that grows ever more 
isolated. In the first paragraph of the second chapter, Cavell begins his book-long answer 
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by registering Panofsky and Bazin's sense that "the basis of the medium of movies is 
photographic, and that a photograph is o/reality or nature." The key in this early register 
is to push the absurdity of the closeness of photograph and photographed well past that 
imagined in the made-up stories of early viewers' genuine fear of being hit by trains from 
motion pictures. The closeness Cavell insists on is the permanency of the relation 
between the photograph and reality; hence, of the publicness of reality photographed. A 
photograph precisely is not a picture, since depiction involves a passing through an 
individual artist's interpretation (of the world) and application (of artistic conventions). 
The connection between reality and painting is merely conventional, absolutely 
contingent, whereas the connection between reality and photographs is not conventional 
but mechanical. The conventions surrounding this medium, established by the maverick 
artisans and artists' explorations of photography's connection to the world, are still 
flourishing and defining further possibilities of the mechanism of the camera.26 
But Cavell ultimately is interested in reaching to the desire that existed before 
photography, located for instance in his appreciation for Baudelaire's descriptions of 
moving carriages and postured gaits, setting the scene of the final state of anticipation in 
the West before the greatest satisfaction of its wish for a mirror held to the world. 
Studying the conditions that made possible the discovery of the camera is the privilege of 
Rothman and Keane spin the difference in the ways painting and photography differently attempted to 
satisfy the wish for the world recreated, the wish as Hamlet puts it for a mirror held up to nature, as a 
difference between realism and reality. Their interest in denying that film has satisfied "once and for all, 
and in its very essence, our obsession with realism" is to shift the plane of discussion from artistic 
conventions to the mechanism of the camera. "Reality is real, not realistic," they state, and turn to Cavell's 
statement about fantasy as that which reality can be mistaken for. They find this blurring of lines between 
fantasy and reality echoed in Cavell's statement about film as "a moving image of skepticism," quoted in 
our epigraph. The mechanical reproduction of the world, mirroring our experience of it, declares and places 
before our eyes our absolute uncertainty about our experience of reality itself. William Rothman and 
Marian Keane, Reading Cavell's The World Viewed: A Philosophical Perspective [Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 2000], 66-8. 
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Cavell's vantage point. Examining how the movies differed from what existed before 
them by rehearsing common over-extensions of language in our shared way of talking 
about them, Cavell's study serves as a type of film criticism therapy. He is not interested 
in enumerating the various possibilities of the camera and creating some kind of 
systematic "ontology". Cavell is interested in how we talk about such things: 
Obviously a photograph of an earthquake, or of Garbo, is not an 
earthquake happening (fortunately), or Garbo in the flesh (unfortunately). 
But this is not very informative. And, moreover, it is no less paradoxical 
or false to hold up a photograph of Garbo and say, "That is not Garbo," if 
all you mean is that the object you are holding up is not a human creature. 
Such trouble in notating so obvious a fact suggests that we do not know 
what a photograph is; we do not know how to place it ontologically. We 
might say that we don't know how to think of the connection between a 
photograph and what it is a photograph of. The image is not a likeness; it 
is not exactly a replica, or a relic, or a shadow, or an apparition either, 
though all of these natural candidates share a striking feature with 
photographs - an aura or history of magic surrounding them.27 
Cavell's insistence on the mysteriousness of the camera by recounting all different types 
of things that do not describe its specific power, leaving the invention of words like 
"photogenesis" to his later writings, precisely functions in the reverse way than the 
method used in his first book of essays described earlier: where the latter aims to 
anticipate the flow of words such that the reader finds himself bound to the logical (not 
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merely implied) meaning of his words, the former works to tear down what words seem 
natural and ordinary. The aims of the two writings are not different: to redress what we 
say to what its saying means, either by leading us to discover what it is we say by saying 
it along with us, or by insisting that certain things we say do not always mean what we 
want them to mean. When one cannot say what it is one must say, one can always show 
what one cannot say. 
Movies are not dreams - but there are nonetheless some shared features. The 
analogy Cavell suggests does not draw the media of movies and dreams together but 
rather between the ways we remember and talk about them. The publicness of movies, 
and yet their presence in the deepest crevasses of our memories, is the first feature Cavell 
touches on and is perhaps the most fundamental common touchstone of his writings 
about film and about language. Where dreams are remembered from sleep, putting words 
to movies is more public - "It is as if you had to remember what happened before you 
slept." Dreams are the site of a pivotal point of contact with Cavell's interest in movies 
and with Freud and psychoanalysis. In this text, dreams are touched on so briefly that the 
weight of Cavell's reflections is often overlooked. Later, in his contribution to Cinema 
and Psychoanalysis, and in texts like his Perfectionism lectures on film Cities of Words, 
the relation between film criticism and the analysis of dreams becomes more explicit. 
Already though, in The World Viewed, Cavell makes an important comment on our 
connection to the movies as being different than dreams in that "other people can help 
you remember." 
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In searching for words for our memories of movies, as with dreams, we often find 
that terms from other art media offer themselves as sensible analogues. But in our 
description of the medium of movies, failing to account for the camera and its 
transformative powers fails to reach the first condition of what a movie is. For instance, a 
painting can be said to be a portrait, or the landscape of a certain river, or the King of 
England in his birthday suit but the connection between the painting and the person is in a 
different register than the between photograph and photographic model. As Cavell's 
described scene above with Garbo and her photograph, we have no notation specific to 
this particular connection. Thinking about abstract painting makes this relation explicit; 
the painter gathers her technique from conventions and traditions and filters her 
imagination through these. Her imagination is the only necessary connection a given 
work has with reality. The technique that makes photographs has nothing to do with 
imagination - it's all mechanisms. So the difference with a photograph is not between the 
photographer's camera and the painter's brush, but between the way the camera depicts 
the world and the way the painter herself does. Cavell calls this mechanical takeover of 
the artist's imagination the camera's automatism. 
In trading imagination for automatism, the photographer gains the world. A 
painting of the world is a representation, filtering the world through the artist's 
imagination and technique, presenting a depiction of something in the artist that, through 
likeness or abstraction, we may recognize and perceive. A photograph projects a view of 
the world itself. It does not reproduce objects in the world, but reproduces our way of 
seeing the world - that is, the world remains out of the artist's hands. This automatic 
reproduction therefore leaves to the artist a different task than those of previous 
26 
generations. The photographer's art consists in holding the rest of the world at bay, to 
confine our view of it and limit its exposure. Cavell puns on this fact: "the camera is a 
kind of room," where people and things are gathered, "not a kind of womb", since 
nothing is created or incubated. 
Before continuing with this important feature of the camera, a third comparison 
after dreams and paintings will take us nearer to Cavell's sense of what is important about 
the camera. Film recordings are like sound recordings - of course, they are like them as a 
mode of preservation, or conservation, or perfect multiplication, and here only like them. 
The recording device that replicates sound is different than that of a camera in ways that 
are blurred now since the advent of sound films in the early half of the twentieth century, 
and it is sometimes an effort to think of them as acting separately. 
Cavell pushes the analogy such that it offers something that doesn't seem to fit: he 
suggests that: 
...the record reproduces its sound, but we cannot say that a photograph 
reproduces a sight (or a look, or an appearance). It can seem that language 
is missing a word at this place. Well, you can always invent a word. But 
one doesn't know what to pin the word on here.30 
In his revision in the enlarged edition, Cavell returns to this point with two clarifying 
aspects of his analogy. The first is that to call something a recording requires an original 
"to which one can be present directly"; and second, that the virtue of a recording is its 
fidelity to this original. Hence, if there is no original that can be copied more or less 
faithfully, then nothing is being recorded. Yet, if someone were to look through the 
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viewfmder of a camera (through, say, the lens and pinhole), the original to which they are 
present is perfectly clear, and the fidelity of the photograph to this original will simply 
depend on the quality of the recording material. Digital video makes this patently evident 
since the view from the camera during the recording is the original to which others are 
more or less faithful. I would like to say that a photograph is the record of the camera's 
sight. 
In this same register, when Cave 11 says that "what is heard comes from 
someplace, whereas what you can see you can look at," he is underlining this very fact. 
Sound reaches us where we are, whereas we reach out to see. And this is where the shift 
occurs: sound moves through space, from someplace to various places; our perception of 
objects moves as we move, moves with us. The trouble is not that "objects are too close 
to their sights", as if there was some difficulty in imagining objects emitting their visual 
signal. The trouble is where Cavell wants the trouble to be: out in the world as opposed to 
with the camera or the viewer. 
In the early chapter, Cavell spins the matter from the side of the object: 
What is missing is not a word, but, so to speak, something in nature - the 
fact that objects don't make sights, or have sights. I feel like saying: 
Objects are too close to their sights to give them up for reproducing: in 
order to reproduce the sights they (as it were) make, you have to reproduce 
them... 
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His insistence on focusing on the object as the point of origin, as opposed to looking 
through the camera, has to do with his emphasis on reality. Recording the camera's sight, 
as I suggested above, is precisely the reproduction of objects. Of course they don't make 
sights, but it does not follow, as Cavell offers, that a photograph is not the reproduction 
of a sight. The recording simply comes from the other side. The recording of a sound has 
to do with reception - the visual equivalent is not a type of reception, coming in from 
somewhere as Cavell says, but a type of perception, looking out. Perceived objects are 
the subjects of a perception. Whether we want to talk about the visibility of such subjects 
or the camera's capacity of perception, what is being recorded is exactly this visibility, 
the subjects of this perception. It may not be the sight given up by the object, but a sight 
is precisely being recorded. Cavell's turning around this point presses the automatic 
capacity of the camera to replace the artist in reproducing the world. 
The final comparison Cavell makes in this chapter invokes Bazin's idea of the 
photograph as a visual mold or impression. Cavell's objection to this is that molds 
typically have "procedures for getting rid of their originals," thus leaving just the mold 
behind. The obvious conclusion is that a photograph is not a mold since the original is 
"still as present as it ever was." He effects the same turnaround here as with sound 
recordings. The idea here though is that a print or a press is not a reproduction of 
something natural but of something that is cast and set. Not only are there ways of getting 
rid of the original, as he puts it, there are also ways of reproducing further copies. Again, 
if we imagine the camera as perceptive, then what it sees and prints is a mold of the light 
and shades that pass through its lens - gone forever as soon as they are printed. But 
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Cavell is here not satisfied with any account of the medium that conceals the 
mysteriousness of its presentation of reality. 
In keeping with the difficulty Cavell insists on in grasping the connection between 
the world and a photograph, his refusal to accept the idea of recording or a mold is not 
that he has not thought of the camera-eye metaphor before. The problem is with the 
camera's anthropomorphosis. A photograph gives us the object, not the subject - the 
subjection of the objects is up to the viewer. By adding that the original still present is not 
"present as it once was to the camera", since the camera is merely the "mold-machine", 
he implies that the camera is our surrogate: presents/or us at a moment that we cannot be 
present at, yet nonetheless offering its present to us. Hence, objects in a photograph are 
present. It is therefore clear that the way the original is present to us in a photograph is 
different than the way an object is present to us physically. The difference is a difference 
of core arguments. Present in a photograph means that the viewer is not present to the 
objects, to the scene, in the photograph. It means the viewer can present him or herself to 
these objects inasmuch as they are the subjects of a photograph. 
What is the connection between a photograph and reality? In distinguishing them, 
we see that what physically exists in front of the camera can become its subject, while 
what appears on a photograph is "this fixing of the subject." This isolation of the way the 
camera sees and records the world could be thought of as the phenomenology of the 
camera, only this would imply that the camera is an entity which had conscious 
experiences. The way Cavell speaks of the camera, and what causes his dissatisfaction 
with other traditional ways of describing the connection between an object and its idea, is 
33
 Cavell, The World Viewed, 20. 
30 
as the description of an object of our experience, which has allowed for the possibilities 
or conditions of our experience of the world. Not that the camera changed the way we see 
the world - "the mirror was in various hands held up to nature" - our isolation from and 
yearning for the presence of the world had already discovered this compromise. The 
world in a photograph is the world that exists to me though I may not exist or be present 
to it. Hence my experience of this will differ from my experience of another art form in 
that what first strikes me and the level at which I first interact with a photograph is as it is 
in reality; this experience will differ from that of reality in that my present is not the 
present of the photograph: I am present at a scene from the past and therefore free and 
constricted in ways unique to this experience.34 
These reflections are from the second chapter of The World Viewed, entitled 
"Sights and Sounds," where the way we talk about and remember dreams sets the scene 
for a series of reflections that end just before returning to the analogy with dreams. After 
drawing the analogies with painting and the visual arts, with sound and molds and prints, 
Cavell finds himself wanting to talk about movies as if they existed in the same condition 
as dreams. He ends the chapter with this sentence: 
The reality in a photograph is present to me while I am not present to it: 
and a world I know and see, but to which I am nevertheless not present 
(through no fault of my subjectivity), is a world past.35 
This sentence could also describe the world of dreams, indeed, a world past which is 
different from that of the movies in that others cannot help remember my dreams. The 
development of film criticism as based on simple descriptions, from memory, of a scene 
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or moment in a film is closely related to the psychoanalytic practice of dream therapy. 
Cavell's interest in the description of film, though related to psychoanalysis, comes 
directly from the practice of ordinary language philosophy and hence more concerned 
with how to put words to the world than to dreams. 
* 
Luther's problem was to combat a foreign institution motivated politically 
and economically, but Kierkegaard's problem is that the mind itself has 
become political and economic; Luther's success was to break the hold of 
an external authority and put it back into the individual soul, but what 
happens when that authority is broken? Luther's problem was to combat 
false definitions of religious categories, but Kierkegaard has to provide 
definitions of them from the beginning. 
From the first pages of Cavell's first book, the topic of grammatical investigations 
begins to take shape with the question entitled by the book and first essay, "Must we 
mean what we say?" The question is unpacked slowly and starts by situating the title as a 
generalized assertion of philosophers of ordinary language: are we morally bound to the 
implications that our language carries in the various contexts in which it is spoken - i.e., 
must we mean what the-things-we-say mean! Before answering whether we indeed must, 
Cavell inquires of the type of necessity this is: are the implications of language logical, 
and if this is the case, is the necessity bound up in the language or in the specific 
contextual use? Very early, twelve pages in, he clearly answers affirmatively deducing 
that as speakers of a language we are "exactly as responsible for the specific implications 
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of our utterances as we are for their explicit factual claims." Only, since they are not 
formally logical (that is, not built into the rules of syntax), the necessity these 
implications carry cannot be derived in the same systematic way. In what register, then, 
must I mean what I imply? Speaking of language-games is Wittgenstein's way of 
marking the distinction of the various contexts where language is used and learned. 
Language-games are governed by grammar - therefore, investigations of the grammar of 
a language game say something about both the language and the context of use. Must we 
mean what we say? Well, we must in the sense that we do, that's just what meaning is -
when someone says something, the words come together to mean something that is 
comprehensible (or not) to those around, and this meaning is tied to the voice of the 
speaker. The "must" is not an obligation on the person to mean what they say; it is a 
statement of a law, like gravity. Remarks about the words used in a given context that 
specify how the word is to be used and what rules govern its use are frequently referred 
to as grammatical investigations, and could be described as the first major theme of Must 
We Mean What We Say?. 
In the third chapter of this book, Cavell brings about the turn that made him 
famous: to draw together a vision of grammatical statements, those commenting on the 
implications of ordinary speech, with aesthetic claims. He returns to this idea of calling 
logic the non-formal implications used in the act of speech by suggesting an 
understanding of the term with heavy overtones of aesthetic judgment, naming "patterns" 
and "agreement" as two "distinct features of the notion of logic." It is this form of 
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agreement that interests Cavell and will remain an aspiration of his writing in aesthetics 
and film criticism but, broadly, across the board as a philosopher. 
The way Cavell's work all comes together has barely even been gestured at, and 
what helpful remarks about how to see Cavell's writings as a body of work come from 
Cavell himself, reflecting back on his life as a writer. In the recent essay "Something out 
of the ordinary" which began as the 1996 Presidential address of the eastern APA 
division, he looks back to his early essay drawing together Wittgenstein's grammatical 
investigations and Kant's claim of aesthetic judgment and pushes the centrality of this 
connection: 
I was not able when I wrote that essay to press this intuitive connection 
very far, for example to surmise why there should be this connection 
between the arrogation of the right to speak for others about the language 
we share and about works of art we cannot bear not to share... but what I 
could not get at, I think now, was the feature of the aesthetic claim, as 
suggested by Kant's description, as a kind of compulsion to share a 
pleasure, hence as tinged with an anxiety that the claim stands to be 
rebuked. It is a condition of, or threat to, that relation of things called 
aesthetic, that something I know and cannot make intelligible stands to be 
lost to me.38 
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Chapter 2 
Cavell's writing on film from the earliest stands as a measure of how far a critic 
or theorist can go in letting the work of art speak for itself, how far a writer can be willing 
to let a film have a say in their experience of the film. Laura Mulvey, lauded pioneer of 
feminist psychoanalytic film theory, stands as the measure of the opposite trend - her 
project, from the beginning, has been to "use psychoanalysis" as a means of building a 
theory of film; and there is no effort to conceal the fact that her film analyses are nothing 
but illustrations of her theory. Another writer working in the cross-section of 
psychoanalysis and film is Slajov Zizek, writing from a specialization in Lacan, and 
while he also uses films to illustrate the concepts he lays out, the rigor of his work and 
the respect he holds for films make for a very different read than Mulvey. Where she lays 
out a concept and brings in a film as evidence for her description, he pushes the reading 
of both the Lacanian concept and of the film and is then surprised at the coincidence. Of 
course this is generated by a mode of writing that unveils discoveries methodologically, 
not empirically, but Zizek is nonetheless open to the possibilities of film, receptive of 
what film has to say about itself. This chapter is split between the presentation and 
critique of Mulvey's famous essay "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," mostly 
following Marian Keane, and between a study of two short sections from Zizek where he 
focuses on Vertigo. 
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 The juxtaposition of Zizek with Mulvey was intended to waylay the blind-sighted animosity that is 
sometime present in texts like Keane's "A Closer Look at Scopophilia," given that Zizek is in accord with 
certain things Mulvey advances simply on the basis of his Lacanian leanings. The repetitions, especially in 
his interpretations of Vertigo, allow for Mulvey's claims more than she makes for herself, and in this way 
gives a better hint into how a text like this one can have the impact it had. 
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2.1 Mulvey 
Published in 1975 in the Oxford based journal Screen, the essay stands alone as 
the most important and, until recently, as the most popular essay in the history of this 
emerging institution of Film Studies.40 It has been taken up by countless chapters and 
essays, assigned in countless college and university courses, and has inspired an 
important following. But even a cursory glance at the essay and the literature that follows 
it is enough to see that the strength of the essay is neither in its psychoanalytic posturing, 
its film analyses, nor its theoretical speculations, but in its emphasis on, it's critical 
discovery of, visual pleasure in the traditional practice of watching movies. The "ironic" 
feminist current that runs through the essay and supports her revolutionary cries to 
destroy pleasure have not fully registered in the shared imaginary of Film Studies.41 For 
we see in the succeeding literature the discovery of the gaze systematically associated to 
her paper, often within the context of her reading of Vertigo, while we find her specific 
postulates concerning the domination and power of subjugation of "the male gaze" more 
or less glossed over. Her work has served Film Studies professionals as more of a starting 
point than a reference text for their reflections on "the look" in its various states, on 
feminist film theory and classical cinema, and on Hitchcock's authorship. Mulvey's essay 
is the prime example of a text that has been well accepted by Film Studies, addressed, 
referenced, dismissed - in short, it has been acknowledged. It stands at the opposite pole, 
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 Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" Screen 16.3 Autumn 1975, 6-18. 
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 Laura Mulvey, "Afterthoughts on 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema' inspired by Duel in the Sun" 
Framework 15/16/17, 1981, 12-5. Mulvey re-approaches the subject, without rejecting the claims from her 
earlier paper, deflects the disparagement of some critics, like Marian Keane, by stating that they 
misunderstood the ironic undertones of her position, calling for instance for her isolation of the "male third 
person" perspective. Keane's objections to Mulvey's poor film analysis, her contorting interpretations of 
Freud and a general misunderstanding of the apparatus of cinema are however only waved at by the excuse 
of a use of irony. 
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in the literature on film available to film students, to Cavell's contemporary 1971 study 
of film, The World Viewed, which remains more of a film studies curio than a 
foundational piece of a standard college curriculum. 
Her paper begins by proposing to use psychoanalysis as a "political weapon, 
demonstrating the way the unconscious of patriarchal society has structured film form" 
(833). The demonstration consists of a theory/application combination, where she first 
describes the psychoanalytic concepts she wishes to put into play, then offers descriptions 
of certain film moments to illustrate "more simply" how these concepts play out. The 
manifesto-like introduction is matched by an equally provocative summary where she 
calls for the destruction of pleasure in narrative cinema by means of critical distanciation, 
both from the filmmaker's "screen illusions" and from the act of viewing itself. All in, 
the essay describes representative moments from Hollywood films and explains how 
these scenes, from Josef von Sternberg and Alfred Hitchcock, "reinforce" in a 
conservative mode the political relations and power structures under the dominant 
phallocentric order.42 
Psychoanalysis, as is well known, is the method of therapy introduced into medicine by Freud and 
Breuer, winning immediate popular acclaim at the turn of the twentieth century and over the course of the 
century, gaining academic notoriety. When Mulvey opens her paper with the claim that she will "use 
psychoanalysis to discover" so on and so forth, we should understand her to be appealing to this long-
standing tradition, the general facts of which are established elsewhere, in her effort to discover how 
spectatorship of classical cinema "reinforces" the oppressive patriarchal subjugation and objectification of 
women. The tone of the entire essay, set in these opening paragraphs, is not a straightforward use of 
psychoanalytic concepts for feminist ends - it is one of avant-garde feminism, decrying the still reigning 
order of patriarchal society. The air of stirring impatience bubbles out with slogans: "The fascination of 
film reinforces the fascination inscribed by the patriarchal order"; "Forgo satisfaction, Destroy pleasure, 
Upset privilege." We can therefore understand her appeal to the traditions and discoveries of 
psychoanalysis as a weapon as an abstraction from psychoanalytic therapy in the form of a critical attack 
on the reigning symbolic order which has pervasively inscribed itself onto the social order of the West. 
What I am calling slogans here, setting the tone of her essay, are more or less read into her lines of the first 
and last paragraph: "This paper intends to use psychoanalysis to discover where and how the fascination of 
film is reinforced by pre-existing patterns of fascination already at work within the individual subject and 
the social formations that have molded him," and "The first blow against monolithic accumulation of 
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Moreover, by unmasking with the weapon of psychoanalysis the unconscious 
motives of Hollywood filmmaking institutions as well as uncovering the fundamental 
drives that motor the narrative of these classical films, it becomes possible to "challenge 
the basic assumptions of mainstream film ... Not in favor of a reconstructed new 
pleasure, ..., but to make way for a total negation of the ease and plenitude of the 
narrative fiction film" (834-835). Psychoanalysis is thus allied with a particularly 
destructive film criticism though not in the interpretation or depreciation of individual 
films. Mulvey's appeal to psychoanalysis (in the names of Freud and Lacan) is the appeal 
to an authority from which she draws generalizations about Western culture and aims at 
the Hollywood institutions from the period a decade or so before and after the second 
war. The concepts she thus amasses provide her with the foundations for her subsequent 
descriptions and explications of films which she extracts into a theory of cinema. 
This theory is primarily structured around her own idea of "the male gaze," 
presumably derived from her cinema studies, and abstracted from a standard three part 
division of artist-art-audience with her notion of gaze governing the union. Her cinematic 
triad runs as follows: the gaze of the camera, in a fairly straight-forward one-dimensional 
association with the artist; the gaze of the spectator, exhausting the relationship between 
viewer and screen; and the gazes of the characters in the story, gazing at each other in 
that beyond away from both spectator and camera. In the summary, we learn that her use 
traditional film conventions (...) is to free the look of the camera into its materiality in time and space and 
the look of the audience into dialectics, passionate detachment. There is no doubt that this destroys the 
satisfaction, pleasure and privilege of the 'invisible guest'..." Mulvey, "Visual Plesaure and Narrative 
Cinema", 6, 18. 
The slogan is a very specific and very dangerous medium: one does not teach grammar in slogans, one 
teaches the rules of grammar. It is a political medium, capable of gathering and swaying large, uproarious 
crowds, and it is crucial to read Mulvey's essay as driven by slogans and in the name of solidarity. In her 
follow-up essay "Afterthoughts on 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema' inspired by Duel in the Sun", 
she names this drive towards solidarity "irony" that many of her readers, she explains, did not understand. 
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of psychoanalysis as a weapon is intended to circumvent the denial of two of these three 
types of "looks": the "pro-filmic event" of shooting the film, incorporated under the 
division of the camera's gaze, and the audience watching the film, gazing at the screen. 
Mulvey asserts that both the gazes of the camera and of the audience are repressed, and 
that these exhibitionistic and the scopophilic aspects of, respectively, filmmaking and 
film viewing, disproportionately absorbed by classical narratives, need to be confronted. 
Ultimately, she poses the interest of applying psychoanalytic structures to the 
interpretation of the film medium, formed by a culture of phallocentric patriarchs, as 
taking steps to "advance our understanding of the status quo, of the patriarchal order in 
which we are caught." Her three levels of cinema's-looking correspond approximately to 
an everyman's theory of film, but for her heavy inflection on seeing. The significance of 
this shift, that is, adding the contraction from reading to watching, is the landmark of her 
essay. This focus shift in the study of narrative, from reading books to watching film, is 
captured with her now infamous insistence upon the gaze. 
Marian Keane is to be counted among those who have attempted to quell the 
overwhelming popularity of Mulvey's essay by bringing up certain important correctives. 
Unlike many of those after "Visual Pleasure..." who offer minor correctives and 
continue, more or less, with the train of Mulvey's interpretation (Williams, Doane, and 
Modeleski, to name a few), Keane wishes to dismiss the entire essay. The correctives she 
picks out are at each of the three levels of Mulvey's argument, starting with the 
descriptions of the films themselves, then adding the descriptions of the psychoanalytic 
concepts she puts into play, and the theoretical postulations about cinema that are based 
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on these concepts and film illustrations. In upturning the famous argument as she does, 
she pinpoints the film camera as the central oversight in Mulvey's text. Her attempt to 
direct the reader towards the specific powers of the camera, in order to reorient Mulvey's 
"discovery" of the gaze, brings her to the clearing (the open expanse, the unbroken 
horizon) of Stanley Cavell's film studies, which begin as we have seen in the previous 
chapter with the question of "what is film?" and whose answer turns immediately to an 
investigation of the camera. 
Keane abstracts the introductory charge against "Visual Pleasure..." to three 
points: 
My disagreement rests with [Mulvey's] understanding of the films she 
calls on as evidence... with her reading of texts by Freud... and perhaps 
most importantly, I find inadequate Mulvey's concept of the camera, its 
powers, and the nature of its gaze. 
What follows this, in what Keane calls a "corollary or consequence of this inadequacy," 
is her first mention of Cavell, whose referenced texts thereafter dominates the theoretical 
side of her response to Mulvey. Starting with her description, or counter-description, of 
certain "powers of the camera," and continuing into her analysis of Mulvey's film 
criticism, where Vertigo is singled out as the reference text, the specific way the camera 
presents James Stewart is at the center of her theoretical realignment. The particular 
power she calls on and remains more or less fixed to is a mode of transformation coined 
as photogenesis. 
Cavell describes photogenesis as the particular way something becomes 
something - "as a caterpillar becomes a butterfly, or a prisoner becomes a count, or as an 
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emotion becomes conscious, or after a long night it becomes light." In these examples 
of his, together with the obviousness of the breadth expressed in the variety of 
transformations he associates with the transformation of the camera, is the sense of an 
ascendancy. The caterpillar/butterfly culminates its existence in the form of a butterfly 
and the emotion becomes recognizable only as it accedes into consciousness. The 
photogenetic transformations of the camera, especially of human beings, produce an 
ethereal existence that is nonetheless permanently fixed to a moment of our everyday 
physical reality: the world of the screen is indeed our world, yet not here and not now. 
This fact, unmatched by any of the other arts, involves speaking in an accent about such 
things as screen figures and human types. The importance of this accent in studying film 
can be observed in the difference between Mulvey's easy-going gaze theory and Cavell's 
reflections on the world viewed. Keane sets up this very dichotomy with Mulvey's study 
of Vertigo and of Scottie's male gaze with Keane's reflections on James Stewart based on 
Cavell's foundational writings on film. 
What Stewart becomes on film is the question that drives Keane's essay and, from 
Cavell's reflections on Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, The Philadelphia Story, It's a 
Wonderful Life, The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, and also on Vertigo, she derives the 
thought that Stewart's figure, gait and demeanor carry feminine qualities, attributes, and 
characteristics. In view of the centrality of the Stewart/Scottie figure for Mulvey's entire 
claim, and of the fact that she reads Stewart's Vertigo cop-turn-detective Scottie as 
representative of the domineering patriarchal gaze, Keane's essay rests on her 
associations of femininity with Stewart's photogenesis. This then spills over into a focus 
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 Stanley Cavell, "What Becomes of Things on Film?", Themes out of School: Effects and Causes 
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984] 174. 
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on the photogenesis of Kim Novak, on the powers of Hitchcock's camera, and the varied 
and complex relationship that exist on the screen between the two actors, the director and 
the camera. 
But before continuing with Keane, let us examine in more depth Mulvey's claim, 
first generally, then through the few examples she uses other than Vertigo: from Mamie 
and Rear Window, from Josef von Sternberg's Morocco and Dishonored, and from 
Howard Hawks' Only Angels have Wings and To Have and Have Not. Each of these 
seven films is called upon as an illustration of both Mulvey's two contrasting modes of 
depicting relations of power. Naturally these are both tied to the gaze at every level. 
"Scopophilia" and "Identification" are the two impulses she centers on in the descriptive 
psychoanalytic part, entitled "Pleasure in Looking/ Fascination with the Human Form." 
After describing them with references to Freud and Lacan, she brings them together in 
what she considers the contradictory, paradoxical space of cinema: 
.. .in film terms, one implies a separation of the erotic identity of the 
subject from the object on the screen (active scopophilia), the other 
demands identification of the ego with the object on the screen through the 
spectator's fascination with and recognition of his like... Both pursue aims 
in indifference to the world that forms the perception of the subject and 
makes a mockery of empirical objectivity. 
Here is where the gender polemic is raised: the woman, she claims, represented on screen 
and pervasively present in society, is the woman who defines herself according to her 
lack, and this lack provides not merely her sexual drive but her entire psychical drive. It 
is a role in the "symbolic order" which is essential to the male role in its sustenance of the 
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male fantasy, the power of possession of that which woman lacks. As a screen 
"representation", "ultimately", the meaning of the female figure is sexual difference. 
In short, Mulvey's charge against narrative cinema as it came out of Hollywood is 
in the form of an analysis of masculinity as it is projected onto viewing audiences and as 
it is presented in movie stories. The perspective she adopts to lay her charge is the 
analyst's, uncovering the grimy underbelly of a lifetime of cinema, the subject of which 
revolves about the male-pleasure induced by the woman on display. The exhibition of 
this woman does not simply stir up pleasure which it in turn satisfies; Mulvey reads into 
film's presentation of the image of woman the corresponding anxiety brought out at the 
very sight of her - an anxiety related to a primal fear of castration.44 
Though she may wish to resound with Freud, the words she chooses in her descriptions of conditions of 
the "phallocentric" world draw her far closer to a position often attributed to Nietzsche, though very likely 
attributable to his sister and the posthumous editions of The Will to Power, where "the feminist" is 
described as "the castrated woman" who imitates the will to truth. In other words, the woman who defines 
femininity as lack and thus, to gain any power and strength, is forced to imitate masculinity. Of course, 
Freud too speaks of castration but in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, he uses the expression 
"castration complex" to describe the root of (what are primarily masculine) perversions. In a note from the 
section entitled "Touching and Looking", he explains: "The compulsion to exhibit, for instance, is also 
closely dependent on the castration complex: it is a means of constantly insisting upon the integrity of one's 
own (male) genitals and it reiterates his infantile satisfaction at the absence of a penis in those of 
women."(23 n.2). Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality edited by James Strachey [New 
York: Basic Books, 2000]. 
Moreover, her insistence on speaking literally of genitals in her discussion of 
scopophilia/exhibitionism and sadism/masochism, in part 2 "Pleasure in Looking/Fascination with the 
Human Form," seems at odds with Freud's own self-corrective between the editions of Three Essays. This 
corrective is the substitution of the term 'genital' from the former 'sexual', where Freud notes that "the 
instincts of scopophilia, exhibitionism and cruelty ... do not enter into intimate relation with genital life 
until later, but are already to be observed in childhood as independent impulses, distinct in the first instance 
from erotogenic sexual activity," 58. On one level, certainly, he means here simply that the instinct acts 
independently of the genitals, as Mulvey recognizes. At another though, Freud maintains the use of the 
term 'children' generally without specification to their gender until the 'Castration complex penis envy' 
subsection, which hence could suggest that scopophilic, exhibitionistic and sadistic/masochistic impulses 
are not gendered. 
To further the matter, we can look to Marian Keane's relevant notes from her essay: 
[Freud's] crucial discovery that these instincts always appear in pairs or, as he puts it 
specifically '[a] sadist is always at the same time amasochist' and 'exhibitionists ... 
exhibit their own genitals in order to obtain a reciprocal view of the genitals of the other 
person" Freud's discovery that scopophilia-exhibitionism and sadism-masochism are 
sexual instincts that occur in ambivalent forms constitutes a deep insight into the nature 
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Here is where the role Mulvey plays of psychoanalyst makes its most definitive 
move: "The male unconscious" she explains, "has two avenues of escape from this 
castration anxiety." The first involves an immediate return to what she calls the "original 
trauma," a return to the scene where the male infant first witnesses the anatomical 
difference of gender difference. Her using words like "investigating" and "demystifying" 
suggests an active cooperation that female counterpart (infant or otherwise) must play. In 
reaction to this, the investigation/demystification takes the form of "devaluation, 
punishment or saving of the guilty object" - the object simply that is designed to suffer is 
naturally "guilty." The type of look associated with this first avenue is voyeurism - and 
in view of the reasons mentioned, is associated with sadism. The second avenue is to 
avoid "dangerous" behavior and to "[completely disavow] castration by the substitution 
of a fetish object or turning the represented figure into a fetish." The look associated with 
this type of reaction to the representation of the female form Mulvey calls "fetishistic 
scopophilia...[which] builds up the physical beauty of the object, transforming into 
something satisfying by itself." 
The two Hawks films only appear in a single short parenthesis as examples of 
films that contain a particular shift from this last mode of scopophilia as fetish that is then 
eclipsed by the voyeur-based narrative. That she should pick two Hawks films as 
illustrations of films that fully contain both scopophilic and voyeuristic modes of erotic 
representation, without mentioning neither Hawks nor any of the other modes of sexual 
of human sexuality. Marian Keane, "A Closer Look at Scopophilia: Mulvey, Hitchcock 
and Vertigo" in A Hitchcock Reader, Marshall Deutelbaum, Leland Poague, eds. [Ames: 
Iowa State University Press, 1986] 238. 
Mulvey's insistence on gendering her concept of the gaze is essential to her thesis - but apparently, and this 
appearance has been confirmed by Keane and others, this does not come from Freud or Lacan. 
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and erotic representation that he is more interested in, is enough to call out as a fault. 
Mulvey claims that these films contain a tension between the two spectatorial modes that 
she speaks of: "direct scopophilic contact with the female form" and a kind of fascinated-
identification with the character and "through him [gain] control and possession of the 
woman within the diegesis." Her choice does well to illustrate her point but neither does 
she go anywhere with the fact of the shift (i.e., so what, there is a modal shift onto one 
that obscures the other), nor does she follow the films to explore why the scopophilic 
gives way to the voyeuristic. 
While Mulvey claims that both modes are indivisibly present in classical 
narrative, she brings in von Sternberg as representative of the first mode and Hitchcock 
that of the second. In the first, von Sternberg gave primacy to "the pictorial space 
enclosed in the frame," presenting the scopophilic as fetishistic, indifferent to the 
narrative, the pleasures of character identification, and camera point of views. Hence in 
his films, the visual pleasure is displaced from the narrative context and "the ultimate 
fetish" directly confronts the gaze of the film's audience with its full "erotic impact." The 
examples she uses concern the unmet gaze of Marlene Dietrich - von Sternberg's leading 
woman for his six primary films - where the audience is privy to all sorts of close-ups, 
glamour shots, filters, and flattering lighting of his star while the male hero is typically 
not present to return the gaze or even to witness the spectacle. 
She mentions the character La Bessiere from Morocco as playing the director's 
surrogate, then follows with two illustrations of what she meant by the absence of the 
male hero at the climactic "high points of emotional drama." The mention of La Bessiere 
as surrogate is contrasted to the audience identification that Mulvey claims is next to non-
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existent for von Sternberg. Conversely, the gaze of the crowds and onlookers in the films, 
which typically represent the audience, "is one with, not standing for, the audience." She 
ends the portion on von Sternberg by emphasizing that in the hero's absence, it is his lack 
of sight that is most important - the fact of his not seeing. At the end of Morocco, 
Dietrich as Amy Jolly follows the French Legion troupe with the other women hangers-
on with Coop marching on ahead unknowing. For her second example, a single line 
suffices her purpose: "at the end of Dishonored, Kranau is indifferent to the fate of 
Magda." With this single interpretative line, Mulvey is ready to conclude that the "erotic 
impact" of scopophilic pleasure is offered, unmediated through narrative, as a "spectacle 
for the audience." 
For the three final films, Mulvey brings together some generalizing statements 
about Hitchcock, referring sporadically to the mentioned films, before concerning herself 
solely in the paper's final film analysis with Vertigo. Her preface of this final analysis, 
the cornerstone of her paper, is prepared by a three step process: the fictional story is 
concerned with the gaze, the director is setting up traditional social dichotomies then 
undermining them from within, and the audience is drawn to the object of fascination 
through identification with the male protagonist. For Mamie, she does not specify how 
the story is about looking, and unlike Rear Window and Vertigo, the theme of looking 
(across a courtyard at a murder/cover-up; at a young beautiful woman who is perhaps 
possessed) is not so easily identifiable. Where the illustration works best (to illustrate her 
concepts) is in the remarks on the relation between Mark and Marnie, beginning with her 
description of Mark as "a dominant male possessing money and power [exemplary of the 
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symbolic order and law]." She further specifies that the power Mark has "is backed by a 
certainty of legal right and the established guilt of the woman (evoking castration, 
psychoanalytically speaking)." And while these are but glosses, the descriptions generally 
fit the film and her abstraction fits her theory. Mark's perversion is disguised (all too 
thinly) under a sheen of wealth and propriety which engulfs most of the male characters 
in the film - for instance, in the way Hitchcock plays with the sensual descriptions of 
"the brunette with the legs" and the variety of onscreen reactions to these. 
Nonetheless, for a film like this one, psychoanalytically inclined with the male 
protagonist virtually playing psychotherapist to the female lead, as it was with the Hawks 
films, there are more important, more central, more obvious things to be stopped by. Her 
final remarks on the film also end the section of film description - they run as follows: 
Marnie, too, performs for Mark Rutland's gaze and masquerades as the 
perfect to-be-looked-at image. He, too, is on the side of the law until, 
drawn in by obsession with her guilt, her secret, he longs to see her in the 
act of committing a crime, make her confess and thus save her. So he, too, 
becomes complicit as he acts out the implications of his power. He 
controls money and words, he can have his cake and eat it.46 
To be sure, there is no description of the film at all, no reminders or place holders to tie to 
her extractions, like Mamie's masquerading or Mark's longing. Mulvey links this 
masquerade to Madeleine's in Vertigo but the similarity is, again, not that obvious -
Marnie is not, say, the accomplice of a sly wife-killer posing for the dupe of a witness 
45
 Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," 16. The passage also mentions Scottie from Vertigo as 
so exemplary. 
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 Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," 17. All three uses of "too" refer to the longer 
description of Vertigo where she references Madeleine and Scottie. 
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and thus masquerading. She is her own Gavin, plotting her robberies and disguising her 
identity by changing her hair color, her name, and her social security number to maintain 
her freedom. The masquerade she pulls with Mark, at the level of plot, is equivalent to 
the entire setup orchestrated by Gavin to rid himself of his wife. In some way, the 
transformation of Judy to Madeleine does not need to happen for Marnie, for she has 
absorbed both sides. Where Judy became Madeleine to lure Scottie, Marnie already knew 
how to be "Madeleine" and how to use this identity. Rather than speak of Madeleine and 
Marnie together, one would have to speak of them as before and after.47 
This is all to say, simply, that if Mulvey wishes to use Marnie in support of her 
claims, she would do well to pursue the connections she proposes. For much like 
Stewart's photogenesis projects feminine attributes, so too does Tippi Hedren's project 
aspects of masculinity. In Marnie, it is more than her sometimes masculine clothes, more 
than the rigidity of her features erstwhile birdlike; the subject of the film, is not "the 
fascination with an image through scopophilic eroticism" as Mulvey suggests, but the 
repression of (desire for) masculinity through some psychological compensation and 
gender-duality, such as is at work in Perkins' Norman Bates. "The look" is central to the 
narrative, as Mulvey claims, but the complexity of its abstracted levels, from Mamie's 
visual intrusion into her mother's world to Mark's verbal intrusion into Mamie's world, 
are far from providing support to her claims. 
Clifford T. Manlove, "Visual 'Drive' and Cinematic Narrative: Reading Gaze Theory in Lacan, 
Hitchcock, and Mulvey," Cinema Journal - 46, Number 3, Spring 2007, 83-108 (100-3). Among the 
several commentators who take the good of Mulvey's gaze theory and leave the bad, Manlove is the only 
one to explicitly call out the inappropriateness of Marnie to explain this theory. He proposes a Lacanian 
distinction between objective and subjective "ways of seeing." This is not dissimilar to what Zizek will 
propose using Lacan with Vertigo and several other films, first in Looking Awry, and scattered across 
several later essays and books. 
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In her use of Rear Window, Mulvey appeals to Jean Douchet's famous article 
from the Cahier du Cinema as if to confirm her claims, but she leaves out as much from 
his essay as she does in her use of the films. She begins by claiming, correctly, that for 
this author from the height of French criticism, Jefferies stands for the audience -
overlooking that Douchet quite clearly goes on to reposition Jeffries' surrogacy and 
postulates that he also stands in for the projector. His sense that Rear Window is 
Hitchcock's concept of cinema at work, much like Wood and others have spoken of 
Vertigo, is based on this dual role played by Jeffries, both projector and spectator, "qui 
fait son propre cinema. "48 One could overlook this difference, by say associating 
projector and audience under the rubric of screening, but the difference is crucial with 
respect to claims such as Mulvey's. As projector-surrogate with his camera, his lenses, 
and his binoculars, Jeffries is rarely seen gazing at anything specific - instead, Hitchcock 
gives us shots of Jefferies looking, then cuts to the windows of his neighbors where his 
gaze resides. And yet, as Mulvey and many contend, he is stuck to his chair, able only to 
look. Following Douchet, as a combination of the two, Jeffries personifies the voyeur -
marking out the subjects to watch and watching them (even to the extent of naming the 
subjects of his projections: Ms. Torso, Ms. Lonelyheart, etc.). 
The issue of Lisa's exhibitionism, paired to Scottie's voyeurism, just does not fit, 
and for reasons Mulvey herself states: Jeffries is simply unenthusiastic in his interest in 
his girlfriend until she becomes part of the game. Conversations between the two from 
the moment we meet Lisa have been about their difference and incompatibility; but when 
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Lisa takes an interest in the murder story, Jeffries' enthusiasm sparks. Mulvey contends 
that when Jeffries sees Lisa "on the screen" across the courtyard, he is hooked as she 
becomes part of his voyeuristic fantasy. And yet it is clearly before this, if we are to 
assess his passion for this woman by his physical reaction (as we've assessed his lack of 
fervor previously) at the moment Lisa picks up the binoculars, that Jeffries emotions turn. 
The film begins with Lisa and Jeffries at opposite poles of a voyeur/exhibitionist 
relationship, but it is one where neither party is satisfied. The pair come together not, as 
Mulvey insists, in this bi-lateral relation but in a mutual and active voyeurism. 
These six examples, excluding Vertigo for the time being, make up the totality of 
films she discusses. She also includes the names of Busby Berkeley and Budd Boetticher 
to this list. By simply mentioning their names she therefore rides her claims about them 
solely on their reputations. Hence, Berkeley's magnificent stage choreographies are 
disparagingly evoked as (mis)treating women as geometric figures on a par with stage 
props; and Boetticher's lifelong study of the lone male figure of the American frontier is 
cast as a repression of women's role in the West. Each of Mulvey's descriptions of 
particular films fall short of providing a key into a deeper understanding of the films or 
the filmmakers. These descriptions, which are always vague and generalizing, are called 
upon to support claims that precede any interpretation of the film. She calls her use of 
film examples "illustrations" of the concepts she wishes to impose on them. Cavell draws 
attention to this very term at a conference held the same year as Mulvey's paper where he 
gives his first full reading of a film, Howard Hawk's Bringing Up Baby (1938). The 
paper was published a year later in 1976 in The Georgia Review, and thereafter made its 
way into his book Pursuits of Happiness as a chapter on Bringing Up Baby, entitled 
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"Leopards in Connecticut," and an afterword entitled "Film in the University" where he 
discusses the emergence of film onto the academic scene. In the latter, he describes his 
distinctive mode of "reading film" specifically as opposed to the common way of using 
films as illustrations. In such uses as these and Mulvey's, the films are called upon in 
support "of some prior set of preoccupations rather than constitute an effort to study the 
medium in and for itself."49 
Returning to Keane's argument, her first objection to Mulvey's paper was her 
dissatisfaction with the way she used films as "evidence" - so not only is Keane 
dissatisfied with the fact that the films are merely being called upon to illustrate some 
preexisting set of concepts, she finds her use of these films to be inadequate even to 
Mulvey's own modest claims. Keane does not pick up any of the films that are discussed 
above but focuses solely on Vertigo as the keystone of Mulvey's claims. 
The first point Keane picks up is the most important point in Mulvey's description 
of Vertigo; the alliance of the camera with Stewart that renders his character Scottie's 
point of view into the camera's point of view. Mulvey calls this Hitchcock's use of a 
subjective camera. Keane points to the scene, discussed in Truffaut's famous interview 
with Hitchcock and made a big deal of in the criticism which followed, where Scottie 
leaves Judy at her hotel and the camera remains with her. And as it does, the camera 
leaps further away from Scottie's subjectivity to reveal, in what Keane calls the "decisive 
turning point," precisely what Scottie had failed to see during the first fateful church 
tower event. The "flashback" sequence, as both Mulvey and Keane call it, is much more 
than simply an authorial insertion of information to an audience: it is placed within the 
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heroine's act of confession to her would-be lover; which is then torn up and thrown away. 
But most importantly, as Keane notes and expands, is that the "flashback" is initiated by 
Novak's direct look into the camera. She describes this specific acknowledgement of the 
camera: 
Her look into the camera registers what she knows, and the flashback that 
follows represents but a piece of that knowledge. She knows not only all 
that took place on the bell tower, but that Stewart/Scottie is right to believe 
he has found Madeleine Elster again. When she looks into Hitchcock's 
camera, she is acknowledging her identity as Madeleine.. .50 
Keane wants the image of Kim Novak, in her mauve sweater and green backlight, sitting 
at the hotel writing desk pen in hand and lifting her head from the paper onto which she is 
writing, to own up to the role she played at the behest of Gavin. But her 
acknowledgement here is not merely of the role she played with Gavin in the swindle, but 
the recognition of the love inside her brimming out beyond the planned scheme. As she 
looks into the camera, she directs the narrative into the flashback.. The active and 
passive forms of instincts Mulvey calls up to describe, respectively, the male gaze and 
female posturing, are brought together here by Keane into an instance of the female gaze. 
Of course, Keane is right to underline the relation that Novak forms with the camera in 
this scene. She is right to point out Mulvey's oversight. She is right to imply that Judy 
knows all that the flashback reveals - but she stops before continuing to examine the 
form this "piece of knowledge" comes in. The confessional is an ancient form of 
communicating remorse and regret, and specifically in a religious sense to be rid of or 
50
 Keane, "A Closer Look at Scopophilia: Mulvey, Hitchcock and Vertigo" 238. 
52 
cleansed of something. This is what she tears up - Judy may very well, as most 
commentators note, wish to have Scottie love her for herself rather than the Madeleine 
she can put on, but she forgoes confession and decides to move on with another plan. 
Keane stands by Judy's decision to tear up her confession and go on lying to Scottie in 
the name of love. 
Keane's strange attachment to this idea of an importance of loving, inexplicably 
missing from feminist studies, ultimately carries her counter-reading of Mulvey's paper. 
She calls out the theme of love as a major preoccupation of Freud's, and therefore studies 
in Freudian psychoanalysis need to account for this aspect of human behavior. 
Notwithstanding all this, Vertigo does not seem to be the obvious choice to illustrate a 
general topic of love - if it were to illustrate anything, it would resemble something 
closer to the loss of love, or its failure. And though her text is a response to Mulvey's 
paper and specially to her analysis of the film, there is something that Mulvey is saying 
that hits the spot with what is going on in the film that Keane does not respond to. 
2.2 Zizek 
Had the animus of this paper been to save Vertigo or Hitchcock or movies 
generally from the hands of misguided instructors, this essay would have begun with a 
tirade directed against Mulvey's use of Vertigo in her backwards project, analogous in 
many regards with Keane. However, this writing is led by an interest in Cavell, and hence 
has instead been directed towards what has been missed and pushed aside in the throes of 
adolescent institutional growing pains. This writing follows a new interest in Cavell's 
writing on film that has spread across North America, attested to by the small yet 
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burgeoning number of articles by film scholars recognizing the importance of these texts; 
these texts which have helped shape an understanding of our relationship to the screen 
image by examining the relation of the camera with the world, and by then turning the 
examination towards the experience of cinema, hinged on the importance of memory and 
of remembering to experience. In his book, Organs Without Bodies, Slajov Zizek notes 
this particular feature of Cavell's film studies: his particular (and now idiosyncratic) 
emphasis on working with films from memory. Cavell is someone that Zizek will 
reference every now and again, and always in favorable tones, but since Zizek sees 
himself working on things that are adjacent but not immediately related, Cavell appears 
only sporadically. In this book, and with reference to Vertigo, this is the only mention of 
Cavell: he comes in to stand as the figure who values the experience of film in 
criticism.51 
In our first chapter, we examined The World Viewed by placing it on a horizon of 
Cavell's effort of writing; the first part of this present chapter surveys the text behind the 
Mulvey phenomenon, with the help of Marian Keane, as a singular text independent of 
any larger project. Moving from Cavell to Mulvey was an attempt to gauge how far the 
early institution of Film Studies was from that of Philosophy; continuing with the 
example of Hitchcock's Vertigo with cultural scholar Slajov Zizek is meant to show to 
that this distance has considerably shortened. The study of films and the subject of 
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philosophy are presently crossing currents in today's institutions of Humanities and Arts. 
The third and final chapter returns to The World Viewed to unpack Cavell's reading of 
Vertigo, which somehow has remained unrecognized by current Hitchcock scholarship, 
as an example of serious early film criticism. This section functions as a bridge between 
Mulvey's and Cavell's readings of Vertigo whose similarity lies only in their brevity. 
Therefore the Lacanian and psychoanalytical structures of Zizek's analyses will be 
downplayed to focus on the reading of Vertigo, while at the same time recognizing that 
this is precisely the context in which his writing on Vertigo appears. 
In Zizek's first study, the ideas of perception and point of view are not discussed 
in relation to the camera, though these will become major themes in the later text, but the 
gaze as a psychoanalytical concept nonetheless makes an appearance: 
The gaze denotes at the same time power (it enables us to exert control 
over the situation, to occupy the position of master), and impotence (as 
bearer of a gaze, we are reduced to the role of passive witness to the 
adversary's action). The gaze, in short, is a perfect embodiment of the 
"impotent Master," one of the central figures of Hitchcockian universe.52 
The archetypal example of this quality of power and impotence associated with the gaze 
is found in Poe's famous short story "The Purloined Letter," where a letter is stolen from 
the Queen in broad view of everyone by a minister who knows something of its 
incriminating nature. The theft is seen by the Queen but she cannot react for fear that her 
husband the King should discover the contents of the letter; the key to this particular 
posturing is that the confrontation is not merely between the minister-thief and the Queen 
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but takes place on a public plane in the presence of a third agent "who personifies the 
innocent ignorance of the 'big Other'."53 The "dialectic of the gaze" involves both seeing 
and being seen but more precisely invokes the third line of sight that sees things (not 
objectively but) from within a particular political order. This gaze is not disinterested; 
quite the contrary, but the interest of the gaze is located precisely at the heart of what the 
big Other is so innocently ignorant of, namely in what the purloined letter reveals about 
the Queen. Hence the advantage of the minister who plays the game on the King's 
political field. The political realm is one where appearances constitute the fabric of the 
real. 
In the preface to his book Looking Awry, where he stages his first run through 
with Vertigo, Zizek describes one of his "new approaches" to Hitchcock as "an 
articulation of the dialectic of deception at work in Hitchcock's films, a dialectic in which 
those who really err are the non-duped" - the title of the section that culminates with 
Vertigo is "How the Non-duped Err," and the concepts the "big Other," of the gaze, and 
of sublimation come in from Lacan. In Organs Without Bodies, Zizek examines the topic 
of sublimation in art starting with Vertigo, again with Lacan and again through these 
same concepts, only here with a focus on the camera. The corollary concepts of the 
"Thing," of the subject as gaze, and of the "third agency" of the camera, dig deeper into 
the Lacanian world of Zizek's Hitchcock. 
The first important text of Lacan relates to the infamous mirror phase, the stage 
where an infant learns to recognize herself as a whole body, separate from her parents 
and other individuals, separate from objects but not made up of separate parts. She is 
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whole and therefore she gains the grasp of her identity as that of the mirrored infant. 
Pointing to the mirror and saying "That is me" is the subject's understanding of her Self. 
This subjectivity comes wholly from outside, and in this phase, the Self is first 
understood as Other. 
Seeing as from a perspective outside the body involves a process of objectifying 
and unifying the human body as a body of humans, "decentralizing" the subjective core 
from the body onto the normative social plane. The infant who recognizes her bodily-self 
in the mirror can do so because she recognizes the bodily whole from other humans. The 
very notion of an embodied selfhood is one that is learned. And notwithstanding the 
presence of constant biological needs, human behavior is learned by observing the 
behavior of humans. 
Lacan, like Freud, points to the mother as the child's first model of desiring: 
learning from this desire and also attempting to satisfy it. The father's interruption of the 
child's designs to satisfy the mother is what Lacan calls "the Law of the Father" (against 
incest but also as a declaration of the family unity), which comes as the castration of the 
child's phallus-for-her-mother. Post-castration is the field of the "big Other." This is here 
familiar ground for anyone in Film Studies but Zizek takes a new approach to Lacanian 
film studies. 
Rather than to explain from the doctor's viewpoint what concepts are at work in 
various movie scenes, which would yield a straightforward illustration of the concepts in 
the play of human interaction on screen, Zizek takes the figure from below the threshold 
of castration, the pervert and the psychotic, to expound his illustrations of psychoanalytic 
concepts. From the perspectives of the unassimilated or only partially assimilated, Zizek 
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describes the "big Other" as an illusion upon which nonetheless hangs the balance of 
reality. 
The "articulation of the dialectic of deception" that Zizek announces in his 
preface is primarily worked on with an interest in narrative, with no emphasis on specific 
shots, cuts or camera movements. He begins by ascribing the feeling where a story 
advances naturally and inevitably towards its conclusion to an illusion which, applied in 
retrospect, "confers the consistency of an organic whole on the preceding events." (69) 
To fully depict the nature of such an illusion, Zizek flips the scenario and locates next to 
this feeling of natural narrative development the "anxious premonition" that still lurks 
behind when the end of a story is given before hand - knowing the outcome of events 
before they occur and nonetheless watching their denouement, "render[s] palpable the 
radical contingency of events." He is suggesting that the feeling that an ending just fits 
the set-up and development of a story is empty, that the necessity of this specific 
coherence is illusory, and that things very well could have gone otherwise. One has only 
to see how differently things could have gone without respect to this sense of a perfect 
and necessary conclusion. "The "big Other" does not exist": the world is chaos, at least as 
far as we can see, systems of meaning, structuring narratives and human relations, are 
nothing but illusions. 
However: 
It would be wrong to conclude from the "nonexistence of the big Other," 
i.e., from the fact that the big Other is just a retroactive illusion masking 
the radical contingency of the real, that we could just suspend these 
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illusions and see things as they really are." The crucial point is that this 
"illusion" structures reality itself: its disintegration leads to a "loss of 
reality." 
One cannot help thinking about the old Cartesian problematic of doubting the sureness of 
one's faculties, and starting afresh on the sure grounds of the assurance of one's 
subjectivity - but am I still /when the big Other does not exists? Where Descartes' faith 
in reality rested in Christianity, Zizek is more modern, after the death of god, the illusions 
(not merely of religion but of reality itself) have no guarantor: I simply am, and I must 
be, unless I am willing to renounce the enchantment of this reality. The subject's relation 
to the big Other is where its relation to itself is found, and the psychotic is the figure for 
whom these illusions are unnecessary.54 
This dialectic of deception frames his study of Vertigo. The topic of the film that 
Zizek focuses on is the sublimation of the woman, where the construction of the perfect 
transcendent image of Madeleine (echoing Mulvey's "perfect image of beauty") is only 
too perfect, slipping away as Scottie comes nearest to possessing her - and this twice. 
One of Zizek's well-worked, oft-turned to devices in reading films, is the what-if trick: 
which consists in hypothesizing about the film in given what-if scenarios that set up the 
discussion around the importance of how something did in fact go down. Here, with 
Vertigo, he examines the development of the film had it ended after Madeleine's suicide, 
the first of the bell tower plunges: 
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We would have the passionate drama of a man who, while striving 
desperately to save a woman from the demons of her past, unwittingly 
pushed her towards her death by the very excessive nature of his love. We 
could even - why not? - give the story a Lacanian twist by interpreting it 
as a variation on the theme of the impossibility of the sexual relationship. 
The elevation of an ordinary, earthly woman to the sublime object always 
entails mortal danger for the miserable creature charged with embodying 
the Thing, since "Woman does not exist."55 
Before going on with Zizek, let us tease out exactly how the narrative would tie up had it 
ended here. First, there is no Judy, and hence, no confession, no masquerade, etc.; and 
second, Gavin is on the level about his concern for his wife's mental stability. The 
narrative which began with Scottie holding on to a rooftop watching his partner plummet 
to his death ends with yet another deathly plummet - the woman he is charged to watch 
becomes the woman he falls in love with, and in an effort to rationally break the spell of 
her dreams leads her to the real places of her nightmares, in essence driving her to the 
stage of her death. The sound of the charges read by the judge at the trial in the scene 
following this one (that makes Scottie writhe in his skin) is uncannily similar. 
Reading the first part alone sustains the Lacanian reading similar to that of a 
typical romantic text; an ordinary woman becomes the object of sublime rapture, luring 
and ensnaring the man fantasy around her fascination with death. The loss of this sublime 
object is all part of the typical romance narrative where part of the lure of death is its 
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involvement with the sublimation of woman. Had the film ended this way, and it could 
have, it would have held together as a classical romantic drama of lost love. 
But it did not, and famously so. Zizek prepares the turnaround moment by giving 
the first part a Lacanian reading since we know that this is not in fact the story of 
Scottie's failure to save the woman (from the "excesses of his love"), but of his failure to 
see through the scam (that there never was a Madeleine for Scottie, that "the Woman 
does not exist"). So Scottie sits in the courthouse on the very grounds of the site of the 
death of his beloved hearing the story being retold in its most accusatory tone, and then 
he becomes lost. The entire scene from the fall of Mrs. Elster to Judy's confession plays 
out as the lull that allows Scottie to take his bearings in the world again; but these 
bearings are all part of Madeleine's universe. It is through his fantasy of Madeleine that 
Scottie is brought back to the world, unawares of Gavin and Judy's ploy, and thus begins 
Judy's second life as Madeleine.56 
This comical identity of "resembling" and "being" announces, however, a 
lethal proximity: if the false Madeleine resembles herself, it is because she 
is in a way already dead. The hero loves her as Madeleine, that is to say, 
insofar as she is dead - the sublimation of her figure is equivalent to her 
mortification in the real.57 
Let us turn things around to Scottie's perspective: this redhead who lives at the 
Empire hotel really (and amazingly, considering) looks like Madeleine; I will do 
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everything I can to enhance whatever it is this girl Judy has to bring out the Madeleine in 
her (while quashing the Judy in her); wait a moment, this is working better than I could 
have hoped, she really does pull off this Madeleine thing; But, how can this be? She is 
Madeleine; but then, she can be Madeleine only because there never was a Madeleine. 
Recognizing the mental leap that Scottie needs to perform between the final appearance 
of Judy as Madeleine and the realization that Madeleine never existed are crucial to 
understanding this second part. 
The obsessive reconstruction of the sublime image turns differently in this version 
of Pygmalion but not because of Scottie's failure; he does everything he can to recreate 
his lost Madeleine from this brute woman but his success, unlike that of Professor 
Higgins, is dependent on the fact that he was merely re-enacting the creation of another 
man - it would be as if Eliza were already a lady in a flower shop, and the professor finds 
out the game is rigged after tasting victory.58 
As I mention Shaw's Pygmalion, I should note the proximity of Hebrew University lecturer Aner 
Preminger's essay from last summer's 2008 Literature/Film Quarterly "Francois Truffaut Rewrites Alfred 
Hitchcock: A Pygmalion Trilogy" to this particular aspect of the film. Preminger examines the type from its 
Greek origin, but seeing as the characters in Vertigo are merely modeling and modifying their respective 
types, I see no advantage Preminger's return to Ovid would have over simply remaining with Shaw, who 
models his characters straight from the types of the myth. In his reading of the film, influenced by the 
current of Mulvey's early paper, Preminger adds a corrective to Truffaut's recounting of it in the Hitchcock 
interview: he claims that what Truffaut misses is that "Judy plays Madeleine not after the model of the real 
Mrs. Elster, but after the model of Carlotta," which results in what he calls "the incarnation of an image of 
a historical figure." The importance of this shift produces for Preminger the resolution to the uncertainty 
surrounding the film by providing the key to understanding the final bell-tower scene. 
In the Pygmalion story, "a sculptor... though he hated women, fell in love with his own ivory 
statue of Aphrodite. In answer to his prayer, the goddess gave life to the statue and he married her"; in the 
first part of the film, "Judy plays Madeleine whose ontological status is that of a total fiction" directed and 
produced by Gavin Elster using Carlotta, and specially her portrait and the story of her suicide, to craft his 
Madeleine; "In the second part we see a reconstruction/recreation/reflection of the first part, in which 
Scottie changes from an actor maneuvered by Elster into a director who maneuvers Judy..." Though he 
describes the film as divided into two part, he points to "two Turning Points", turning the significance of 
the film...: the first is at the foot of the bridge where Judy jumps into the water and Carlotta becomes flesh 
for Scottie; the second is where Scottie "spots Judy as resembling the dead Madeleine, and proceeds to 
transform her into Madeleine." 
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And here, Zizek takes the reading further than most: 
The hero puts all his efforts into transforming Judy into a new 
"Madeleine," into producing a sublime object, when, all of a sudden, he 
becomes aware that "Madeleine" herself was Judy, this common girl. The 
point of such a reversal is not that an earthly woman can never fully 
conform to the sublime ideal, on the contrary, it is the sublime object 
herself ("Madeleine") that loses her power of fascination.59 
Recall the setting of Zizek's what-if where he proposes the Lacanian reading of 
the impossibility of a sexual relationship as fitting to the first part of the film, Scottie's 
loss of Madeleine functioned as the loss of the sublime image at precisely the moment 
where he would have possessed her - the lesson learned is that transcendent beauty has 
its price to pay. In the second part, his loss of Judy is of a different nature. Following the 
Pygmalion interpretive-key, where the first loss is inflicted upon Scottie, and in the 
second through the blindness he unwittingly inflicts upon himself; both losses are similar, 
they are both of a woman, of the same woman. For Zizek, this second loss is not the loss 
These two storylines, first the doubling structure of the Pygmalion myth and second the Turning 
Points that suggest three phases, play on Judy's pliancy in both the hands of Gavin and of Scottie, which 
itself opens up the scenario of creation - Gavin creates Madeleine for "power and freedom"; Scottie for 
love. But Scottie's blindness to what he was creating, for he was indeed unwittingly recreating Gavin's 
Madeleine, is what leads to the inevitably of the film's ending. Preminger and Mulvey are not alone here in 
their sense that the ending of this film is prescribed somehow by the events of the narrative. If we accept 
the inevitability of the ending, there is something that is being missed. 
For when Preminger claims after describing the two transformations of Judy, "From here on the 
film moves on to its inevitable resolution, where Judy is led to her death by falling from the tower and 
Scottie is liberated from his vertigo" as if there is no remainder to the equation, he is brushing off a whole 
leg of criticism with this offering as the solution. It ultimately suggests itself as the disenchantment of 
Vertigo. The point Preminger begins with, correcting Truffaut on the model of Gavin's Madeleine from 
Gavin's actual wife to Carlotta, is somehow lost in the brilliance of the inevitability of the plot. The fact of 
the nun's immediate relation to Judy's death in causing the fall is equally neglected. These last two points 
are at the center of both Zizek's and Cavell's reading of the film. 
59
 Zizek, Looking Awry, 85. 
63 
of the woman but of the sublime image: "by obtaining the object, we lose the fascinating 
dimension of loss as that which captivates our desires."60 
As Judy asks Scottie to fix the clasp on her necklace, Madeleine's necklace, 
Carlotta 's necklace, all at once, the hold that "Madeleine's image" had on his fantasy 
breaks down. He calls this Madeleine's "second death" with scare quotes because it is not 
literally the death of a physical woman but functions as the loss of loss, the breakdown of 
his fantasy. For Zizek, this second loss implies a cure for Scottie, who he points to on the 
bell-tower looking down without crumbling, as being cured from his vertigo as well. The 
duration between his affixing the clasp on the neck of this woman who has taken him for 
a ride, and the scene in the bell-tower when she is brought to see that he knows what she 
knows, that he knows more than she knows, is time that needs accounting for. Does 
Scottie gradually become unhinged and unintentionally drive Judy off the ledge? Or does 
everything come together the moment he sees the fateful necklace, and the drive to San 
Batista and the climb up the tower become part of his retributive designs? 
Before answering these questions, or even weighing what answering them would 
mean, let us elaborate more precisely on this "second death," the death of Scottie's 
fantasy. For Zizek, subjectivity is on the outside; Scottie catches up with what the camera 
has been revealing since the first shot of Madeleine at Ernie's. In his second take on 
Vertigo in Organs Without Bodies, Zizek begins by making an appeal to what he calls 
Cavell's theory of misrepresentation in pointing out the way the first appearance of 
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Madeleine is systematically described by critics, "from Wood to Spoto," as shot from 
Scottie's point of view. 
A fluid tracking shot advances towards the black and red-glass doors of the 
restaurant and dissolves into Zizek's first shot. The movement, though somewhat jolted 
by the dissolve, continues its fluid movement from outside as Scottie appears through the 
dissolve, framed from the waist: the shot begins with his head and eyes already turned 
towards something off-screen to his right, our left. As he leans back only slightly from 
the bar, tilting his head as he leans, the camera tracks back, then quickly pans left, leaving 
Scottie at the bar and throwing an eye over a crowded busy restaurant. The tracking that 
continues in this shot moves through the other guests and finds its way to Elster's table 
where Elster and Madeleine are getting up from their chairs. The shot is not Scottie's 
point-of-view, clearly; and yet, as Zizek claims, this and the following problem shot are 
included in the suture of the rest of the scene (the standard series of shots of a person 
viewing, coupled with the counter-shot of the viewed object). Zizek is among the few to 
single out that the audio track happens to play an important role in this sequence, starting 
with the bustling clamor of a busy restaurant that is drowned out by Hermann's swelling 
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interesting tensions that will lead into and prepare for Cavell's singularly brilliant reading in the following 
chapter. 
The subject of this first section is framed by the invocation of Cavell as representative of a theory 
of misrepresentations, prizing the description of film from memory especially when the frames of the film 
don't match up, calling attention to this as a special mode of perception. In calling up the scene from 
Ernie's, two things are set into motion immediately: the first is the juxtaposition of the critic, who writes 
and misrepresents film as accented with his or her own "libidinal investments", with Scottie, the subject of 
the transcription error of these critics; the second is the idea of "the gaze as object, free from the strings that 
attach it to a particular subject." Zizek, Organs Without Bodies, 154. 
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violin score "which accompanies the camera in its gradual approach of the fascinum," the 
"naked back" of a black velvet dressed Kim Novak. The play on the soundtrack supports 
Zizek's argument of "total subjectivity", literally drowning out the diegetic sound of real 
life with the swell of an emotional\mental\spiritual affection echoed in the music. 
Both Zizek and Mulvey associate the camera's perspective with Scottie, but while 
Mulvey crudely links the audience to the camera and to Scottie in one careless brush, 
Zizek is more subtle. He suggests that the moments where the camera disengages from its 
literal alliance with Scottie are sometimes those moments where Scottie is most invested, 
with the single exception of Judy's flashback - which will be discussed later. The first 
shot is one of these moments where the camera's gaze, detached from any character, is 
nonetheless somehow allied with a given and, also, with the audience. Here is where 
Zizek's appeal to Cavell's so-called theory of misrepresentation comes in: it is not that 
the critics whom Zizek names have identified with Scottie, and therefore feel Scottie's 
perspective as theirs, hence misidentifying the shot - these critics are given the eye of the 
camera, as the audience is, and are introduced to Madeleine through the same 
masquerade set-up as Scottie. The camera, Hitchcock's major ally, is directing the gaze -
primordial and essential. 
Just thinking about Mulvey in the discussion of this scene shows exactly how obnoxious and harmful her 
text has been to students of cinema. Unlike most critics who mistakenly ascribe these shots to Scottie's 
point of view, Mulvey is not discussing this scene specifically but every scene generally save that of the 
flashback. Whether or not her notion of point of view is literal or not, when the stakes of her interpretation 
rest on calling the camera subjective, the details of a scene like this one which are not that complex should 
be enough for any reader to discard a interpretation of the film that begins with these words: 
In Vertigo, subjective camera predominates, apart from one flash-back from Judy's point of view, 
the narrative is woven around what Scottie sees or fails to see. The audience follows the growth of 
his erotic obsession and subsequent despair precisely from his point of view. 
Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," 15. 
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While the first shot enacts the metaphor of casting an eye over something, whose 
literalness Zizek pushes far, the second shot has nothing to do with eye-casting unless we 
move to a metaphysical eye-casting, say the doubly metaphorical, where the camera's eye 
drifts from Scottie's visual point of view to his mental or emotional point of view. The 
single shot comes after a shot-counter shot sequence, repeated once to count four shots, 
where Scottie is shown at the bar, head turned, looking through the partition straight at 
the advancing Madeleine. As she approaches the bar, Scottie turns his glance slightly 
away from her. There is a close-up, from a higher angle than before of Scottie looking 
away towards the bar, then the cut to the fantasy Madeleine seen from no perspective but 
that of the kino-eye, then another cut to Scottie turned the other way to catch a glimpse of 
her leaving, and a final cut to the shot of Gavin catching up to her and the two leaving 
together. The fantasy shot does not fit with the shot-countershot sequence in which 
Scottie observes Madeleine followed by Gavin getting up from their table and leaving the 
restaurant. The camera is dislocated from the sutured scene of Scottie gazing at the 
couple and instead aligns itself for a single shot with what we want to call Scottie's 
fantasy. Zizek underscores the red from the background wallpaper swelling as "almost 
threatening to explode in red heat turning into a yellow blaze," in the same way as the 
effect of the music had combined with the wandering camera. Here, the effect of the 
color combines with the surreal detached subjectivized gaze to seal the scorching fantasy 
in Scottie's mind. 
But in associating these two shots with Scottie, and suggesting that Hitchcock's 
camera identifies with Scottie, we must be careful with what we are calling point of view. 
How much depends on the identification of the camera's perception with the physical 
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location of its subjects? Calling a shot subjective outside of these conventions, as we 
suggested above with the "metaphysical" point of view, breaks down the convention by 
taking away the single defining necessity of the shot - i.e. that it mimic the perspective of 
one of its subjects. If we concede the possibility of a metaphysical point of view, then 
anything and everything could be considered some type of point of view, and the game 
would be to place the camera's projection either onto physical bodies or onto mental 
states - thus effacing the existing conventions that generated such possibilities in the first 
place. 
Zizek calls this out in another scene from Vertigo were the object-gaze manifests 
its detachment to the subjects in the narrative. The scene is in Scottie's apartment where 
he has brought Madeleine after rescuing her from her plunge into the bay. The opening 
shot begins with a full shot of Scottie kneeling by the burning fire, throwing in a log, then 
the camera pans left in an arching motion displaying the array of the apartment, starting 
with the couch where Scottie turns from the fire to sit and sip his cup of tea. Midway 
through the pan, the camera faces Scottie's open kitchen where Madeleine's dress, 
stockings, and various garments are hung to dry. The pan continues and ends its 180 
degree turn on the open door of Scottie's bedroom, revealing Madeleine asleep in his bed. 
There should be no question of subjective point of view here, and there does not appear 
to be any allegiance between the camera and any of the characters. What Zizek picks up 
on is the dupe pulled by Hitchcock not to show Madeleine's underwear on the clothes-
line but only her dress and a few unidentifiable cloths. But the pan is so quick, even 
though it is a slow pan, that an audience watching the film without pausing on these 
frames will automatically assume that the nondescript cloths hanging are her 
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undergarments. The censorship implied by this absence, concealing only the fact (and not 
the implication) that Scottie would have had to take her undergarments off to undress her, 
brings Zizek to ask who the shot is intended for, that is, who the censorship is for? His 
answer is "the 'big Other' itself, in the sense of the all-seeing, but stupid and innocent, 
observer."63 
Zizek's examples match three types of identification. In the first, where the 
camera wanders without a body through the aisles of the restaurant, Scottie's point of 
view is discarded for a better look at Madeleine and we are effectively shown the room 
and Gavin and Madeleine's table. Here we are invited to identify with the camera in the 
first person. In the second, the camera inserts a frame of the "totally subjectivized" image 
of Scottie's fantasy. We are shown Scottie's fantasy in a way that somehow belongs to 
him, different than his point of view shot. One might say this image is ascribed to him. 
The way the camera breaks into its subject can be thought of here as speaking for the 
second person - this is your fantasy Scottie - in a way that the dislocated camera 
meandering through the tables belongs to us rather than to Scottie. The third example 
plays with the juxtaposition of the real audience with this non-existent presumed 
audience: the real audience is shown the outer garments and non-descript white rags but 
sees underwear, while the presumed audience sees the rags that are inexplicably missing 
when Madeleine takes her clothes. This shot of the white rags on the line is not about 
Hollywood decency, say in the same register as the two beds that were required in a 
couple's bedroom, but a declaration of the virtuosity of its creator. The eye that was 
Zizek, Organs Without Bodies, 156. 
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released to wander the aisles of the restaurant, and to break into Scottie's subjective 
fantasy, is also capable of transcending the screen barrier and look out at its audience. 
It is more difficult to see this third example as part of the triad that Zizek offers to 
explain the camera-eye in Vertigo - he lists a forth in footnote and implies that there can 
be several more to be found, and that these merely stand out for him. The fourth example 
is the shot of the petals falling into the bay from Madeleine's bouquet at the foot of the 
bridge, framed in close up from no possible character perspective. This same camera 
placement sets-up another later shot of Madeleine in the bay, again from no specific 
subjective point of view. Suggesting Judy's perspective as having some kind of 
premonition brings us closest to Zizek's idea of the pre-subjective substance that 
embodies the organ-without-body of the camera-eye. 
In the discussion of undergarments in the apartment scene, Zizek brings us to an 
example of a subject outside the film that somehow directs the gaze. But all his examples 
together point to more than this: Zizek is proposing a subject-less subjectivity, a void 
around the sublime object of the gaze that draws the subject towards the object. This 
model reverses the traditional notion of a subject gazing at, but never reaching, the 
sublime object - the gaze exists in itself and contains both subject and object. And is this 
not exactly what the cinema is: a gaze which contains both viewer and viewed? 
The idea of sublimation in Vertigo is invoked by Zizek through Lacan in Looking 
Awry where the "object elevated to the dignity of the Thing" is illustrated in Madeleine's 
first embodiment of "sublime" inaccessible beauty, and again by Judy as the raw 
immaterial texture for Scottie to mold a new Madeleine. The first apparition vanishes as 
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he is about to come to possess it; and the second apparition loses its gloss, its spirit, what 
made it what it was, and reverses the fantasy. The gaze as object is the functioning organ 
in both cases where Kim Novak, "Madeleine" and Judy all bear the gaze. 
Another tripling hauntingly echoes the camera's study of this woman. The mask 
that Gavin and Judy create of Carlotta's ghost becomes an illusion essential to 
understanding Vertigo, beyond the mere physics of corporeal bodies. Gavin stages a 
scene where "his wife," played by Judy, is possessed by the ghost of Carlotta. Before 
Scottie's retransformation of Judy, the relation of director-actress-audience is replayed 
piece by piece: adulterous spouse-killer with Hitchcock; trampy pickup girl with Novak; 
and the dupe of dupes for falling for the whole thing with the audience. When Scottie 
takes the reins in redressing a new Madeleine onto Judy, the mirroring is less perfect. 
Judy plays her role for Scottie as she had for Gavin, and in some way, Scottie does stand 
in for the director as he clearly controls the movement of the narrative at this point. The 
problem emerges when Scottie also becomes the audience for Madeleine. What Scottie 
sees from the other side of the mirror as he set to clasp the chain of the necklace is not 
merely this setup, nor even that of Gavin's murderous scheme. Scottie sees through to 
Hitchcock, or whatever Hitchcock could stand for in this world. More importantly, 
Scottie's seeing through to understanding his role in the larger scheme meant merging his 
narrative with hers. 
No one, not even Zizek who comes so close here, points to the presence of the 
three women in this embodiment of the loss of fantasy: as the necklace goes on, the three 
women (Carlotta, "Madeleine," and Judy) become one, but why do the following actions 
happen the way that they do? What inevitability can be attributed, even in retrospect, to 
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Scottie's actions in the face of the necklace? He is neither the level-headed Ferguson we 
had met earlier in the film at Midge's (who we may expect to bring the woman into the 
station house), nor is he the dazed amorous Scottie blind to his whim (who may swoon 
and find himself again in the hospital). Can we explain how he seems to understand 
everything instantly and mete out justice by leading her to jump from the tower? 
All along the drive Scottie is piecing things together but it is only as he climbs 
the bell tower that things are revealed. As they ascend the tower, Scottie undergoes two 
more bouts of vertigo, signified by the tracking-zooming "vertigo" effect felt before on 
his previous failed ascension. He is not cured from the moment he sees the necklace. 
Once past the place where he had stopped, he turns to Judy and calls her Madeleine: 
"This was as far as I could get," and he turns his head towards a cowering Judy, "but you 
went on." "Remember?" He continues to stare at her and she whips around, finally 
confronted directly and verbally as Madeleine. "The necklace Madeleine, that was the 
slip. I remembered the necklace." The past comes out through Scottie's enraged inquiries, 
pulling her, by her waist, by her neck and shoulders, squeezing the facts from the 
squealing answers Judy lets escape from her throat. But what was the slip of the 
necklace? Scottie says she should not have been so "sentimental." 
The shot of the necklace that precedes the flashback tracks toward Judy's neckline 
too close to be Scottie's view - the pendent on the necklace grows so large and red that it 
seems to scorch the white skin beneath. We are gain in the realm of the presubjective. 
The follow-up shot, cutting away from the close up of Judy's neck to that of Carlotta's, 
tracks back to frame the entire portrait as far as to include Judy (posing as Madeleine in 
her grey suit) sitting before the painting at the Palace of the Legion of Honor. All in one 
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shot, Hitchcock gives Scottie the juxtaposition wherein everything is made clear: 
Carlotta 's necklace. Judy had never worn the necklace as Madeleine, it was explicitly 
something of Carlotta's, hence of Madeleine's. All at once, "the whole fantasy structure 
that gave consistency to his falls apart."64 
One is very tempted to attribute the conceptual death of Madeleine at the sight of 
the necklace to Scottie, but we must concede that Judy somehow sees it as well. Judy 
chooses to put the necklace on with the black dress that Scottie describes in detail to the 
storekeeper "with a square neck," the one replicating the dress from the first scene at 
Ernie's. Scottie says she should not have been "so sentimental" in keeping a souvenir of a 
murder. But was it not precisely her sentimentality that brought her to put on the 
necklace? She wanted to offer something to Scottie by way of adding this symbolic 
coordinate to the universe of his fantasy; as a gift over and above what she had already 
done. 
The disconnect came at precisely the moment Judy offered something of herself 
to Scottie's Madeleine, paradoxically at the moment when she was most fully willing to 
suffer reconstruction. It is upon this physical body that the film weds the myth of Carlotta 
to the murder of Mrs. Elster. Madeleine's spectral presence precedes even her first 
incarnation at the hands of Gavin Elster. When Judy puts on the necklace, wittingly or 
not, she seals her fate with that of her predecessors. Carlotta gives birth to a child, is 
thrown away, goes crazy and commits suicide; Mrs. Elster marries a man who kills her 
for her money. However this is described, this story is the most complex of any of 
Vertigo's internal stories. Zizek's conclusion differs from Mulvey's reading of the film's 
Zizek, Looking Awry, 86. 
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dominating "masculine perspective." For Zizek, "Vertigo tells us more about the impasse 
of the woman's being a symptom of man than most 'women's films'."65 
In a suggestive line that, I believe, is intended to go along as an experiment in 
criticism, Zizek imagines the scenario wherein Gavin Elster "does not exist," in the way 
that the "big Other" does not exist. With all the mechanism and machinations he 
embodies, Gavin is a contingent explanation of an otherwise explainable situation: 
Scottie's libidinal investment in the figure of Judy creates the story of a concerned 
husband, a wife possessed of a ghost from the past, bordering on suicide, his friend 
Midge's reservations about the whole thing, his own affectation of love and concern for 
this woman, her ultimate suicide, and the dejection and loss felt by her husband. Zizek is 
proposing that we examine the story as told from Scottie's perspective, from the depth of 
his perversion, from his otherness from the social system. The sexual forces that drew 
him towards Judy are "explained away" in this fiction directed at the viewer just as 
Scottie tried to explain away Madeleine's madness; each figure is a coordinate for some 
impasse or failure in Scottie's elaborate fantasy. Of course, the film continues after 
Scottie emerges from his pathological devastation and we are immediately given Judy's 
explanation that contradicts this reading. But what if Judy's confession was precisely the 
explanation that emerges from Scottie's psychotic imagination? Judy is not and never 
was Madeleine, and Scottie is perversely imposing himself on this needy and suggestible 
woman Judy. Only once the necklace breaks the trance does this reading fail. Here lies 
Zizek's brilliance: in playing out the experiment until this point, the viewer is confronted 
Zizek, Looking Awry, 86. 
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with an extreme view of Scottie's psychosis. The revelation the necklace brings him is 
not simply that it was all a sham, but that the sham was all real. And this is precisely what 
he was trying to escape. 
Zizek ends his discussion of Vertigo by bringing in two scenes that support his 
claim, or at least importantly do not contradict it: the phone call from Elster to Scottie's 
apartment where he has brought Madeleine after her jump into the bay, and the presence 
of the nun atop the bell-tower at the end of the film. The phone call interrupts what Zizek, 
and Charles Barr whom he cites (and Rothman in The "I" of the Camera, and many 
others), consider the moment of tenderness that tugs the first strings of romance of 
Scottie and Madeleine's hands touching as she warms herself by the fire wrapped in 
nothing but his bed blanket. The interruption gives Madeleine enough time to leave the 
apartment, with her clothes, and hang the moment in an interruption or delay of sexual 
contact. Of course, the delay enhances the appeal of what escaped, building an intimate 
romantic, even sexual relationship on the already lain foundations of her ghostly 
possession. (On this note, few critics have weighed in on what is to be made of Scottie's 
willingness, eagerness, to pursue a relation with a married woman.) The non-existence of 
Elster in Zizek's postulation is his intimate linking with the authorial figure of Hitchcock. 
Every critic notes the association Hitchcock makes with the Gavin Elster 
character by walking across the shipping lot on our first introduction to this shipping 
mogul. Never however, does the fact that he is carrying a tool box have any effect on the 
type of relationship that is described - Hitchcock presenting himself as a tool man 
(wearing a suit, no less) on Gavin's lot. The way that Gavin does not exist is in a way that 
Hitchcock's camera does: Gavin is the master-figure behind all the narrative movements 
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that lead up to Judy's death, whereas Hitchcock's camera is there not leading but 
anticipating the development. 
Zizek leaves this suggestion of Elster's non-existence as an endnote to a fruitful 
discussion of the forces at work in the film, and as a microcosm of Hitchcock's larger 
oeuvre. More powerful than a mere lingering and untied ending, this closing suggestion 
opens up from his discussion of a film that represents for an entire generation of cinema 
the question of levels or compartments of authorship. The camera is not simply allied to 
the author, nor is the director or writer as is often footnoted in discussion of cinematic 
authorship. What Zizek proposes here is to examine the way the film thinks about its own 
authorship - a refreshing take that is reminiscent of Cavell. 
Zizek remains with Charles Barr for the description of his second and final point, 
the nun appearing "the very moment Scottie and Judy embrace in reconciliation." This 
very description, that Scottie was willing to "accept the reality of Judy," or Barr's 
description of the moment as "the first time they are being completely open and honest 
with each other," does not prevail in Zizek's interpretation. Scottie's repeating Judy's 
earlier "no, no, it's too late" all but confirms the contrary. She may want to go on, though 
constrained by forces larger than their relationship; but Scottie is utterly repulsed and 
wants nothing to do with her. In Zizek's proposal of Gavin Elster as a creation of 
Scottie's sick mind, the presence of the nun is explained as the libidinal incarnation of 
Scottie's fantasy - a fantasy that is no longer about possessing a woman, but about 
destroying and punishing her. Interestingly, Hitchcock's insertion of this religious figure 
in the scene where Scottie wrenches the confession from Judy, the very confession she 
was considering at one time giving herself but nonetheless withheld, twists this 
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retributive fantasy into Hitchcock's career-long obsession with religion and religious 
symbolism. In the following chapter, we will examine Cavell's related but strikingly 
different take on Hitchcock and religion, including his study of the figure of Judy as, 
figuratively and literally, "the fallen nun."66 
Cavell, The World Viewed, 87. 
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Chapter 3 
Cavell's reading of Vertigo is confined to but a few pages from The World Viewed 
and to scattered references in Pursuits of Happiness and some later lectures. His 
interpretation of the Hitchcock film nonetheless holds an important place as the film 
about the creation of a woman adjacent to those of his studied genres, as an empty 
placeholder waiting to be replaced by a fuller study. For brevity and clarity's sake, we 
will study a short passage from Pursuits of Happiness, then examine the passage on 
Vertigo from The World Viewed in light of Cavell's claims in Pursuits of Happiness. 
Rather than sketch Cavell's most significant contribution to film history in the form of a 
survey of his work on the sister genres of comedies of remarriage and the melodrama of 
the unknown woman, the idea here is to point to the source of fascination at the heart of 
his film studies. The first passage in question is a quick aside from Cavell's main text on 
George Cukor's Adam's Rib, where his earlier film A Woman's Face is read as a parable 
of film directing. In this short text he comes to state as explicitly as anywhere the interest 
fueling the study of such comedies, which turns out also to be the pivot point to his later 
study of melodramas. The site is of what Cavell calls the camera's original violence and 
his interest is in "the film director's original responsibility." 
The remarks on Vertigo from The World Viewed, returned to after absorbing his 
later texts, anchor the more famous studies of genre with his earlier "ontological 
reflections" around the origins of film. Hitchcock's near obsession with religious 
symbolism (churches and nuns in this film) is the primary region Cavell examines in this 
text, "a zone" he describes "in which superstition, expectancy, explanation, and obsession 
cross one another." The religious icons that Hitchcock plays with throughout his career 
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connect with the original source of movies, or should I say the original source of the 
desire for movies, of the desire to see the world unseen. The expression Cavell uses for 
this particular transcendental aspect does not come from above or beyond the world but 
as emerges from "below the world." Connections to this realm are made more explicit 
with touch points from Roman Polanski's Rosemary's Baby. By replacing Polanski's film 
with Cukor's, this study of Cavell on Vertigo bridges his concept of horror as "the 
perception of the instability of the fact of human existence, its neighboring of the 
inhuman, of the monstrous," with his more popular and expansive study of the creation of 
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woman. 
In Cukor's parable of film directing, two figures are pitted against each other as 
vying for the love of a single woman. However, their amorous vying is not depicted as a 
competition of one man against another but as part of the woman's decision of which 
world she will inhabit. This decision, located entirely within the woman and expressed as 
her conferral of love, hinges on the two men's creation of her. By focusing on the 
woman's choice, her decisions relating to who she will permit to guide and lead her, to 
direct and control her, rather than on the overtures or flirtations of her would-be suitors, 
Cukor makes this a film about self-creation as well as direction - or rather, portrays 
direction as a process that involves both actor and director. The first man, openly 
depicted as villainous, seduces the woman (who is not used to seduction because of her 
facial disfigurement) and entrances her with his European wiles and sophistication. The 
good surgeon is played by a serious and solemn Melvin Douglas, made all the more 
solemn when thought of in proximity to his more common lighter roles, is nonetheless 
67
 Cavell, The World Viewed, 86-7; Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness, 218, 222-3. 
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presented as married and an unlikely candidate for romance. The surgery he performs to 
remove the scar from her face, together with his coaching and therapy regarding the 
dangers of a beautiful face, is opposed to the villainous man's seduction. 
The villain, played by Conrad Veidt, seduces her, attracts her, and then asks 
things of her. He leads her as an underling in his criminal undertakings. Seduced, the 
woman not only complies but does so willingly, happy in the nest her disfigurement has 
found a home in. But when her exterior is transformed, she is challenged to live up to her 
external beauty and become the beautiful, kind woman she never could be behind the veil 
of ugliness. The place where the actress becomes a star is principally in front of her 
audience; behind the camera directing every play of the game is the director. Even after 
the surgery, the director's coaching and encouragement are only seen as love when she 
understands the difference between the roles of Conrad Veidt and Melvin Douglas. The 
seduction and control of the villainous man is affected like one would play a Marianette -
the soulless doll can jump around and play out a story but is empty inside, must be empty 
inside. The contrast with Douglas's calling out the ugliness within, calling her out from 
beneath the edge of his blade that has made her outer being beautiful, is contained in his 
calling her "my little Galatea," - the statue which comes to life. Once sculpted, Douglas 
entreats her to come bring her outer beauty to life, he entreats her to continue and 
culminate his creation - this is his direction. 
In contrast to the comedies of remarriage that Cavell studies in Pursuits of 
Happiness, Joan Crawford's choice between a plainly villainous and a plainly good man 
681 note here that Cavell does not speak of director surrogacy but of the film as being "a parable of 
directing." Pursuits of Happiness, 182. The difference is that the relation of surrogacy supplants the initial 
context of director-actor to an unnatural one of director-character. The parable functions at the wider 
narrative level and aligns two contexts where the relationship is more than simply analogical. 
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is made easier than for women in typical comedies. But, in fact, the choice is not easy, 
although it is clearly obvious. Cavell describes Crawford's decision of which man to 
follow, her discovery of which man she loves, "a piece of cinematic code for a type of 
love between which it is by no means easy to choose." Speaking of the type of love, as 
opposed to the type of man loved, is the slight inflection that gives to this parable the 
weight Cavell is looking for: 
The evil of the villainous procedure is that while it promises the woman 
release it leaves her unchanged, above all sealed in the isolation of her 
moral disfigurement... The good of the heroic procedure is that the point 
of the excruciating physical pain is to leave the matter of spiritual change 
up to her; the doctor repeated asks her whether he has create a monster or 
a woman, appealing to the realm of her better angel. This is why direction 
is therapeutic.69 
The creation of a woman culminating with a remarriage is the theme of the comedies 
Cavell studies; his aside about this Cukor film, together with references to touchstones of 
his directing career from The Women to My Fair Lady, lead him to hold up remarriage 
comedies as one possible treatment of the creation of women and, quite generally, 
Vertigo as the film about the creation of a woman through other means. The connection 
with these two films are not so far off, though in Vertigo, the woman's choice is not so 
easily described as the locus of the film's theme.70 
69
 Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness, 219. 
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 In Cavell's melodramas, the creation of the woman is left up to herself, and this "solitude or 
unknownness" is seen as better than "a marriage of irritation, silent condescension, and questionlessness." 
Stanley Cavell, Contesting Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman [Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996] 11. 
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To begin with a contrast, in Vertigo there are no good directors, though quite 
clearly there are two men involved in directing. In the first, the woman Judy has fallen in 
love with a married man, Gavin Elster master planner and villain extraordinaire, began an 
affair with him, and colluded with him to commit murder - a relationship not unlike that 
one formed between Veidt and Crawford. Where A Woman's Face concludes happily 
with the little boy in peril being saved and the villain's demise, the first part of Vertigo 
ends precisely opposite: Elster's murderous plot to kill his wife comes off, the woman is 
murdered and dumped from atop the church bell-tower. When "Madeleine Elster" arrives 
to tell Scottie about her nightmare in the scene before the first fateful drive to San Batista, 
she has already witnessed the murder. The mock terror she splays out for Scottie leads 
him to his psychoanalytic reading of her dream, which leads out to the tower in San 
Batista. This is importantly not real terror (the real terror of having witnessed the death of 
a woman wrung by the hands of her current lover) but precise acting.71 The "perfect 
pliability" of Kim Novak's body, a characteristic that Cavell praises Hitchcock for 
discovering, is on display here. In the hands of Gavin Elster is not only his wife's neck 
but also the strings to his Carlotta-Madeleine Frankenstein. 
The text William Rothman devotes to Vertigo also situates the scene where Madeleine bursts in to tell 
Scottie her dream as carrying the importance of Scottie's "embracing of the mystery." He goes on to situate 
the mystery that begins simply as the fabricated Madeleine-Carlotta tale spun by Gavin Elster and Judy, to 
one that ensnares all levels of interpretation with a figure like Carlotta-Madeleine-Barton-Novak. This 
scene is the only scene, in its extended length from the knock at the door rousing Scottie from his sleep 
until the fall from the tower, where the figure Carlotta-Madeleine-Barton-Novak exists on the screen at all, 
and all at once. Rothman is the only commentator of the film to note the importance of this particular scene 
in Scottie's apartment. William Rothman, The "I" of the Camera: Essays in Film Criticism, History, and 
Aesthetics [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004] 222-6. 
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 In A Woman's Face, after the surgery, Melvin Douglas asks whether or not he has created a 
Frankenstein. The idea of Galatea becoming a Frankenstein melds the history of man's attempts to create 
man, to displace God in the creation of life, with marriage and the Genesis creation story of woman from 
the rib of man. Cavell examines the latter side of this broad concept in his study of Adam's Rib in 
Contesting Tears, 27-9. 
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And Frankenstein she is. This scene, from her emergence into Scottie's apartment 
with her terrible nightmare until the toss off the tower, is Elster's directorial finale and 
stands as the model of this type of directing. The second part of the film, which begins 
with Scottie's search for another Madeleine on this new director's casting stage, is the 
image of inept direction - of empty direction, worse than villainous. Scottie's re-creation 
of Judy as Madeleine not merely leaves the woman empty and unfulfilled, but is himself 
renouncing his own voice in this new creation. His failure to meet the first Madeleine on 
the psychoanalytic plane marks the point of his resignation. The popular expression 
credited to George Santayana about repeating history is aimed at those who do not learn 
from it. And Scottie did not learn from Gavin's direction. 
Hitchcock trades on an idea that even Freud could not stomach - that the 
fantasy of a transcendent God is not, is perhaps the central experience 
which is not, original in childhood, but is the product of adults, creatures 
whose knowledge is of childhood past... To understand his effect, one 
needs to know the source of the Tightness in his setting, not merely their 
irony and wittiness: Kim Novak's final fall from the tower being tripped 
off by the sudden fluttering of a nun, Stewart's world snapping at the high 
point of a church... 
This "fantasy of a transcendent God" that Cavell mentions above is not meant to 
encompass religion in its entirety; it is the fantastic notion that a human being can create 
itself a conception of God. And what Hitchcock "trades on" is not merely that this fantasy 
is a construction often concealing ulterior designs, but that it nonetheless intersects a 
73
 Cavell, The World Viewed, 86-7. 
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genuine transcendental realm beyond the control of any fixed fantasy. So there is the 
fantasy that conceals both the realm of human designs as well as genuine transcendental 
experience. Beyond his blindness to Gavin's construction of Madeleine, beyond his 
blindness to the woman Judy beneath Madeleine, he is blind to the fire he is playing with 
in resurrecting Carlotta: the calamity of Scottie's second failure lies here. 
Cavell calls out a type of Hitchcockian heroine as the "defrocked nun"; in every 
Hitchcock film, the incestuous Shadow of a Doubt and the perverse Under Capricorn 
proving the rule, the heroine is a slightly younger than middle-aged woman, unmarried 
and romantically eligible.74 In referring to this type as a former nun, Cavell aligns the 
relevance of the woman's side of the religious context with Hitchcock who, 
biographically as well as artistically, can be said to exist in a post-Christian realm. The 
icons of a religion past remain as signposts of a deep abyss left by the death of God. The 
second birth of the heroine at the hands of the hero protagonist is antithetical to the 
religious notion of salvation as rebirth, coming from above. Judy's birth as Madeleine at 
Gavin's hand was designed to murder a woman, and at Scottie's hand, unwittingly so -
and this is the force of such creation from below the world. The stand-in for the good 
director in A Woman's Face fears that he has created a monster. In the first part of 
Vertigo we are shown just what these types of monsters can do; in the second, we are 
shown just what they can bring others to do, we are shown the power contained beneath 
the delicate sheen of a fabricated womanhood. The danger of such power is that if it is 
not controlled, it remains active. 
74
 There must be something about Joseph Cotton that calls out this perversity. Other films that do not fit are 
the two The Man Who Knew Too Much films, that both have their explanations. Mr. and Mrs. Smith is a 
film that plays on this characterization. 
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If Cukor's film is a parable of directing, Vertigo is a parable of the cinematic 
creation of woman, and specifically of the transformative powers of "the camera's 
original violence." Judy's death is necessary for this emblem to fit, for the creations of 
this woman are not happy creations, and are not the creations of human beings. Gavin's 
work on Judy made her into the star with whom Scottie fell in love without having 
spoken. Gavin wrote the part for her, coached her, molded her, and she played the part 
perfectly (Scottie says that she played the part "very well"). From his first sighting of her 
at Ernie's, Scottie sees Madeleine from an invisible state, following her choreographed 
gestures from the distance of a private detective; as with Joan Crawford and Conrad 
Veidt, her play for Gavin is reminiscent of theatrical play. Returning to Cavell's writing 
on King Lear examined in the first chapter, he describes the theater as the space wherein 
the audience is not present to the characters but the characters are present to the audience. 
Scottie's invisibility is more a matter of practice than of convention, but the claim here is 
not that this is actual theater. The idea is that in this parable of cinematic transformation 
is the very foundation which Cavell locates at the heart of the distinction between theater 
and film: the photographic process. 
When Scottie trades in his supposed invisibility, he does so not like the yokel who 
jumps onto the stage and interrupts the proceedings - Scottie's emergence into the water 
is planned scene. Madeleine leaps into the bay, and Scottie jumps in after her and brings 
her back to his apartment: and the woman becomes flesh. Naked and covered in only 
drapery, the scene begins with the declaration of her nudity and leads towards Scottie's 
hopes of an amorous relationship. From their hands grazing as Scottie and Madeleine curl 
up to each other in the fire lit room, to the ocean side embrace they share after the walk in 
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the oversized sequoia woods, up to their embrace in the stables at San Batista and 
Scottie's failure of grabbing hold of the woman's body as she made her way up the tower 
stairs - Scottie's relation to this woman is to her body; and this woman's body is not the 
body of the woman she claims. Judy is donning the Madeleine costume as a theatrical 
robe. 
In Scottie's aimless wandering after the hearing and after the institutional stay, he 
goes back to wandering Madeleine's old haunts in search for the next Madeleine. From 
his first meeting with Judy and up until the moment where she ceases to be Judy, that is 
before her dress, make-up and hair fully replicate Madeleine, Scottie is unhappy, he is 
gruff, he is pushy, and he is manipulative. Once his fantasy is enlivened, he himself is 
transplanted to the world of San Batista. His photogenic memory of the place and of the 
woman is the catalysts for this new amorous liaison. Her transformation for him is a 
symbol for the transforming powers of the camera. 
But there is more to the story than the contrast between the two directors handling 
of the woman: there is the necklace. This tell-tale necklace that betrays Judy's secret, was 
part of Madeleine's world that Scottie was trying to overcome - first, in his therapeutic 
efforts with Madeleine ("If I could just find the key..."), and second in his complete 
reconstruction of Judy as Madeleine omitting every trace of psychology and of 
Madeleine's inner life and troubles. Contrast here the reconstruction of Joan Crawford's 
face in Cukor's A Woman's Face and the woman's role in this creation: after the surgery 
is performed, Melvin Douglas leaves the rest of the transformation, the so-called inner 
transformation, up to her. Here, Judy's very first initiative to participate in this 
construction, beyond her pathetic pleas for Scottie to love her for herself, ends in 
86 
catastrophe. Wanting to please her director, she tries to complete the picture and in this 
participation reveals her inner self- not the self that pleaded for a return of her love for 
him, but the self that was in on the original con. For Judy, the necklace was an 
enhancement, a final touch to cap off his creation, but it not only broke down the image 
of Madeleine he had just constructed, it collapsed the two women into one; and these 
women are not Judy and Madeleine, but Judy and Carlotta - and this for the second time, 
where this time, there is no surrogate body to offer in her stead. 
The notion of one woman playing two different women who nonetheless look 
identical to movie audiences and the characters of the movie abounds in classical 
Hollywood more than anywhere. Two films come to mind in relevance to Vertigo in this 
light: Preston Sturges's Lady Eve with Barbara Stanwyck, and Cukor's Two Faced 
Woman with Greta Garbo, both comedies of remarriage. In the first, Stanwyck is in love 
with a man (Fonda) who breaks off the relationship when he discovers she is a card shark 
who has taken him for a ride. Stanwyck then pretends to be an English woman, by 
changing nothing but her voice, in order to "teach him a lesson" about deception and 
love. In the second film, Garbo pretends to be her own twin sister to teach her husband 
(Melvin Douglas) a lesson about moderation, restraint and sobriety by acting without. In 
both films, the man returns to the original version of the woman and this is made to be 
understood as a return to virtue. 
The play of one woman acting as another to fool her husband, lover, or would-be 
suitor and teach him a lesson is turned around in Vertigo, and the relation to the 
remarriage comedy is implicit. This film plays out the doubling game in a reverse 
manner: it begins with a woman playing an artificial role to fool the man who will 
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become her lover. Though here, the designs do not originate with the woman teaching the 
man a lesson. If lessons attempted, they come from the man: "You shouldn't keep 
souvenirs from a killing!" is the first but it is tied to the second that is far more relevant. 
In the escalation of the tower steps, a tortured Scottie explains to a frightened Judy that 
he knows everything and after he cautions her about the souvenir, he adds that she 
"shouldn't have been so sentimental."75 
On the surface, this may not appear to be a trenchant critique of Judy - it seems 
on the contrary to be beside the point, for her sentimental slip was what led him to piece 
together the murder and cover-up. He is therefore not calling out her complicity in the 
killing but her failure to keep it secret. Of course, one may read this as a bit of sarcastic 
sentimentality itself, coming from an emotionally distraught Scottie. If one were to think 
of sentimentality as the cocooning interest in one's own feelings, Scottie's issue with the 
necklace is that it doesn't belong in his fantasy. As it happens, this reproach reflects an 
important shift in the nature of the Hitchcockian leading lady.76 
75
 We find here yet another moment that parallels the comedies of remarriage: the man's responsibility, or 
his impression of a responsibility, to educate the woman. In It Happened One Night, Clack Gable is nick-
named "Professor," in Bringing Up Baby and The Philadelphia Story, Cary Grant is given to nagging 
reproaches and to long moralizing lectures. And in Adam's Rib, Spencer Tracy brings himself to false tears 
to teach his wife something about cheap sentimentality. In the comedies, this education is welcome and a 
requirement for the endings they earn. 
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 This shift occurs across Hollywood films where, according to Cavell, "conviction in the movies 
originating myths and geniuses ... has been lost, or baffled." The title of this section is appropriately 
entitled "The End of Myths," and here Cavell responds to the list of character types that he has compiled in 
the earlier chapters with a new list, beginning each set of groupings with the formula "We no longer grant, 
or take it for granted, that..." One such grouping refers to the reception of intelligence in women - the time 
where "stylish dumb women are as interesting as stylish intelligent ones" is presumably over, that is, no 
longer are intelligent women thought of as beautiful, at least in the way that dumb ones could be. In other 
words, in claiming that "dumb women" like Hedy Lamarr, or Madeleine Carroll, are like the so-called 
intelligent ones, like Katherine Hepburn or Carole Lombard, Cavell is suggesting something about a 
difference in the bodies of new screen women. For instance, an intelligence such as carried by Carole 
Lombard, and seen most clearly in the roles where she forcibly represses the appearance of this 
intelligence, has to do with her mastery of her body. Norma Shearer is perhaps the model for this mold. 
Such women did not need to be told where to confer their amorous favors (nor have to give explanations 
for them). The intelligence of a Katherine Hepburn, far more intimidating and forceful, is displayed by an 
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Cavell speaks of the Hitchcock heroine as once promising an intimate passion 
from the coldness of her exterior - Alida Valli from The Paradine Case is perhaps the 
finest example of this. The late Hitchcock heroines - Grace Kelly, Kim Novak, Tippi 
Hedren - animate this coldness with a denseness that contains a further promise of 
vulgarity, "thus heightening the perverseness of the lust they invite." He outlines the shift 
by contrasting Hedren's role in The Birds with Bergman's role in Notorious: 
Time changes. During the Second World War, at the end of Notorious, a 
Hitchcock hero rescues another sickened lady from a dangerous house, 
supporting her dazed body on the long walk to his car. But that lady will 
stand again on her own two feet, facing her lover... The new lady will not 
be recovered: she has flown into her own imagination.. ,77 
When Ingrid Bergman refuses to tell Cary Grant that she loves him, and refuses to allow 
this to be assumed, she turns the conclusion of the film into a stage for Grant's 
sentimentality to win over everything. When Hedren does this to Rod Taylor, he is in no 
position to so indulge. The passion concealed by her cold exterior is not a normal sexual 
intimacy but a perverse "rut of virginity... now claimed by nature." In the final attack on 
awareness and control not merely of her own body but also of the world surrounding it. She is nonetheless 
a prize worth winning equal to any other leading lady. The difference from figures like Janet Gaynor or 
Alice Faye, who are both as beautiful and capable as the others, is that intelligence shifts the place of 
dominance - these women are not won but themselves pick their prize. Cavell adds Garbo and Dietrich to 
this line and describes them as often "suppressing a running giggle at their lover's ignorance of this 
facVThe World Viewed, 63-4. Cavell introduces in the earlier chapter, "The Military Man and the 
Woman," the myth of community that is supported by the image of men uniform, of "men doing the work 
of the world, in consort," and hence asserting the harmony and productivity of society. Women, in this 
light, stand as threats to this community by luring the men either to inside of the familial home and away 
from the work of the world, or outside the community and openly opposing its conventions. The dandy is 
also considered anti-community, though by no lure from others. He withholds himself from community. 
The complication of the myth of women is that this is rarely so simple. His first example, showing the 
woman refusing marriage in support of the community is Now, Voyager, one of the four films Cavell will 
use years later in the definition of the melodrama of the unknown woman. The World Viewed, 47-51. 
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 Cavell The World Viewed, 66. 
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the Brenner house, Cavell points to our introduction to Hedren: "She is framed alone; we 
enter the picture of her at those gripping knees." Nature has replaced man for this 
woman, and instinct has taken her over just as it has the birds. Once the household is 
asleep, Hedren is "aroused" by the bird noises in the attic and "responds to its call... to be 
rutted by all the bird of heaven." If Bergman's coldness invites the sentimentality of her 
lover, Hedren's is a concealment of her inability to be sentimental. 
The issue here of sentimentality, from its expression in weepiness or tenderness or 
torrid passion, is what the woman's body has to do with predictions of such expression. 
When Grace Kelly excites Cary Grant's passion for jewels in To Catch a Thief, 
Hitchcock shows her response of excitement by lifting the camera from the couch where 
she and Grant have begun to embrace to outside where the fireworks display pops out 
explosions of fire and light. Cavell cautions against treating this shot as a banal (and 
"cliche") substitution for graphic sexuality: 
[Hitchcock] has converted this conventional movie dodge into a specific 
display of this girl's imagination... here the conventional symbol exposes 
a conventional imagination of the deed... She does not want to incorporate 
her man but to be absorbed into his fantasy. 
Further evidence of this shift can be seen upon a cursory glance to Rear Window, where 
only after some initial resistance is she indeed "absorbed into his fantasy." As far as 
Vertigo goes, the matter of her absorption into his fantasy is obvious, but here her 
sentimentality gets in the way of the fantasy. If the last vestiges of Judy's individuality 
(and hence, of her sentimentality) died when Madeleine was fully reformed, her recovery 
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of some inner life, even as this was Madeleine's inner life, was too much for the 
pathological perversity of Scottie's fantasy. 
In the added essay of the enlarged edition of The World Viewed, Cavell returns to 
the distinction between screen and stage. About the stage actor, who is present to the 
audience in the guise of the character, he says that a human being is up there, present and 
live in performance. About the screen actor the issue is not as simple. Obviously, there is 
no human being on the screen and settling the issue about what is on the screen will 
either conclude in emptiness (finding there is nothing but some projected light and 
shadow) or in a further mystery (finding that there is a "human something" up there). The 
discussion in our first chapter surrounding the role of reality in film underscores this 
mystery. Cavell follows up on the mystery by suggesting that the idea of a recording, 
seemingly aptly borrowed from the idea of a musical recording, cannot fit the description 
of screen acting. Newsreels roughly match the sound recording analogy when they record 
events which occur independently of the camera (though this is a naive way of thinking 
about newsreels, even early single-reelers). Movies however are never even candidates 
for being records of events because such events have never happened - at least, not in the 
way that they appear on screen. The "projection of reality," as opposed to a live 
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performance, revolves about the mystery of the camera. 
The mythological point about the camera's revelations is twofold: first, 
that the camera has no choice either over what is revealed to it nor over 
78
 The examination of this passage in Chapter One, approaches the idea of recording from a slightly 
different angle. One might say that the earlier study was more concerned with the ontological status of the 
photographic whereas here the focus is the mythological. 
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what it reveals; and second, that what is revealed to and by it can only be 
70 
known by what appears upon the print or screen. 
Cavell's two fold point about the camera's specific power adds a slight but critical 
inflection to the idea of its being a (relatively) simple mechanism that can ingest the 
world and project it anew: the first relating to its lack of choice in what is filmed, and the 
second in the detachment of what is revealed to the camera with what the camera reveals. 
Regarding the camera's lack of choice, Cavell calls the camera not honest but dumb, 
mute and ignorant about what is being filmed - and this stands to reason for we are 
talking about a machine. The choice of what is revealed to the camera is entirely up to the 
cameraman (in the largest aspect of the entity controlling the camera). And here lies the 
crux of the analysis - that, notwithstanding both the camera's dumb intransigence and the 
cameraman's liberty to do it will with the camera, "you cannot know what you've made 
the camera do, what is revealed to it, unless its results have appeared." 
.. .the mysteriousness of a photograph lies not in the machinery which 
produces it, but in the unfathomable abyss between what it captures (its 
subject) and what is captured for us (this fixing of the subject), the 
metaphysical wait between exposure and exhibition, the absolute authority 
or finality of the fixed image... The photographic mystery is that you can 
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 Cavell, The World Viewed, 184-5. The essay added to the enlarged edition was written during the same 
period as Cavell was writing Part Four of The Claim of Reason were a particular idea of mythological is 
taken on in relation to the space between the body and the soul, to the "metaphysical hiddenness" of the 
soul of the other, to the "fantasy of privacy" that sees the body as a veil for the soul. The same idea of the 
mythological is at work in the passage on the camera. 
Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy [New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1979] 365-70. 
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know both the appearance and the reality, but that nevertheless the one is 
unpredictable from the other. 
Moving from the ontological difference between the stage actor and the screen 
actor to the mythological distance between body and soul is precisely the move that 
Hitchcock analogically performs in Vertigo. As noted above, the first part of the film is 
reminiscent of the theater, with its focus on the physicality of its female star, on the all-
importance of the body, which ends, almost magically, with the dead drop of Madeleine's 
body. I suggest an air of magic because the superposition of Madeleine Elster's body to 
the conclusion of this part of the narrative gives to the end of the film a ghostly 
undertone. Once Judy becomes Madeleine (again, as it were), the matter of who's soul is 
controlling or inhabiting her body becomes the main issue of the film. Scottie's 
transformation of Judy, recalling the cinematic process, involved luring her into his 
private fantasy. But this lure also involved the breaking down of Judy's resistance, each 
transformation requiring Scottie to insist and impose his will. Only after the final 
resistance is broken down, once she lifts her hair from off her shoulders and fixes it up in 
a bun, can the couple enclose themselves away from the world, and into the realm of 
fantasy. Hitchcock shoots their embrace after Judy's full reconstruction into Madeleine 
in a 360° circular pan that Cavell relates to a cocoon enfolding the couple in Scottie's 
fantasy. The scene that the couple is transplanted to is from the climax of the first part of 
the film where Scottie believes he has found the key to solving Madeleine's dream 
enigma, and has cured her from her obsession with the past. His return to this space in 
this newly enacted reality is a declaration of his victory over her, of her complete 
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 Cavell, The World Viewed, 187. 
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submission. And more than this, it is a show of the camera's specific power to transform 
and create: 
The succession of the man's images are neither really seen nor merely 
imagined nor simply remembered by him. They are projections and 
successions of the reality he enacts. They invoke the status of film images. 
Q 1 
But they simultaneously violate this status. 
The violation that Cavell mentions here concerns the position from which these images 
are produced: personal, fragmented, and unshareable. Scottie's reconstruction of 
Madeleine is a reconstruction of his private fantasy, unknowable to anyone who has not 
undergone the same affectation as he, including Judy (despite her knowledge of the 
events). The violence of his transformation of Judy matches the camera's original 
violence, but his pathological indulgence imprecates his fantasy and dooms his love. 
If one thinks of the Romance, say of The Winter's Tale, as the satisfaction 
of impossible yet unappeasable human wishes, and hence as defining a 
presiding wish of movies generally, one might think of Vertigo as a 
declaration of the end of Romance. 
Vertigo is a film about Scottie's "impossible yet unappeasable" human wish to possess a 
woman, this woman. His initial enchantment and his first loss enshrine his desire; his 
reconstruction bespeaks the unappeasable in this desire. In a world of such desiring men 
and of such empty women, Romance, as it was once known in Hollywood, is over. 
Cavell, The World Viewed, 202-3. 
Cavell, The World Viewed, 203. 
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